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Abstract 
The aim of this research essay is to examine the structural 
nature of theory in Information Systems. Despite the impor 
tance of theory, questions relating to its form and structure 
are neglected in comparison with questions relating to episte 
mology. The essay addresses issues of causality, explanation, 
prediction, and generalization that underlie an understanding 
of theory. A taxonomy is proposed that classifies information 
systems theories with respect to the manner in which four 
central goals are addressed: analysis, explanation, predic 
tion, and prescription. Five interrelated types of theory are 
distinguished: (I) theory for analyzing, (2) theory for ex 
plaining, (3) theory for predicting, (4) theory for explaining 
and predicting, and (5) theory for design and action. 
Examples illustrate the nature of each theory type. The appli 
cability of the taxonomy is demonstrated by classifying a 
sample of journal articles. The paper contributes by showing 
that multiple views of theory exist and by exposing the 
assumptions underlying different viewpoints. In addition, it 
is suggested that the type of theory under development can 
influence the choice of an epistemological approach. Support 
Allen Lee was the accepting senior editor for this paper. M. Lynne Markus, 
Michael D. Myers, and Robert W. Zmud served as reviewers. 
is given for the legitimacy and value of each theory type. The 
building of integrated bodies of theory that encompass all 
theory types is advocated. 
Keywords: Theory, theory taxonomy, theory structure, infor 
mation systems discipline, philosophy of science, philosophy 
of social sciences, interpretivist theory, design theory, design 
science, explanation, prediction, causality, generalization 
Introduction ^ ^^ ^ ^ 
The aim of this essay is to examine the structural nature of 
theory in the discipline of Information Systems. There are a 
number of grounds for believing that this meta-theoretical 
exploration is both necessary and timely. Calls continue for 
"good theory" in IS (Watson 2001) and the development of 
our "own" theory (Weber 2003). Despite the recognition of 
the need for theory development, however, there is limited 
discussion in IS forums of what theory means in IS and what 
form contributions to knowledge can take. 
To place this discussion in context, consider the questions that 
arise about the bodies of knowledge or theories encompassed 
in a discipline. These questions fall into a number of inter 
related classes2: 
1. Domain questions. What phenomena are of interest in 
the discipline? What are the core problems or topics of 
interest? What are the boundaries of the discipline? 
9 
"The last three of these four classes have parallels in the three sets of issues 
distinguished by Godfrey-Smith (2003) for thinking about the philosophy of 
science: (1) the logical structure of science, (2) epistemological and 
methodological issues, and (3) scientific thinking, or the social organization 
of science. When thinking about one discipline in particular, we need to add 
the first class to define the range of phenomena of interest in that discipline. 
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2. Structural or ontological questions. What is theory? 
How is this term understood in the discipline? Of what 
is theory composed? What forms do contributions to 
knowledge take? How is theory expressed? What types 
of claims or statements can be made? What types of 
questions are addressed? 
3. Epistemological questions. How is theory constructed? 
How can scientific knowledge be acquired? How is 
theory tested? What research methods can be used? 
What criteria are applied to judge the soundness and 
rigor of research methods? 
4. Socio-political questions. How is the disciplinary knowl 
edge understood by stakeholders against the backdrop of 
human affairs? Where and by whom has theory been 
developed? What are the history and sociology of theory 
evolution? Are scholars in the discipline in general 
agreement about current theories or do profound differ 
ences of opinion exist? How is knowledge applied? Is 
the knowledge expected to be relevant and useful in a 
practical sense? Are there social, ethical, or political 
issues associated with the use of the disciplinary 
knowledge? 
Each of these classes of questions has received attention. 
Examination of each category, however, shows that questions 
falling into the second category have received limited treat 
ment in the extant literature. Each of these classes of 
questions is considered in turn, leaving the second category 
until last. 
With respect to the first category, questions about the domain 
of interest of IS research have remained a topic of interest 
since the inception of the discipline. Argument about the 
definition of management information systems dates back to 
the 1970s (Benbasat 2001) and many writers have debated 
aspects of our domain identity since that time. A selection of 
articles illustrates the range and history of this stream of 
debate. Weber (1987) was concerned with identifying the 
unique nature of IS that distinguished it from other disci 
plines. Orlikowski and Iacono (2001) argued for attention to 
the information technology artifact as the core subject matter 
of the IS discipline. Benbasat and Zmud (2003) proposed a 
core set of phenomena to define the IS field, generating 
further debate in a series of articles in Communications of the 
Association of Information Systems (2003, Volume 12). 
Epistemological questions, in the third category, have also 
received considerable attention. Numerous articles argue the 
merits of different paradigms for conducting research in IS. 
Frequently, debate is framed in terms of distinctions between 
positivist and interpretivist paradigms (for example, see 
Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991) or between qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Some have argued for pluralism in 
methods (Mingers 2001) or for integrating approaches (Lee 
1991). There has been little or no recognition to date in IS of 
the view that the research approach adopted could vary with 
different types of theory in IS, which is a view underlying this 
essay. 
Socio-political questions, in the fourth category, address 
diverse issues. Into this category fall questions concerning 
the historical development of scientific thought in a disci 
plinary community (as in Kuhn 1996). An example in Infor 
mation Systems is the analysis of how the interpretivist 
paradigm has emerged historically in contrast to positivism 
(Walsham 1995). There is also discussion of political, power, 
and prestige issues for the discipline. The benefits and costs 
of diversity in IS research to the discipline have been 
considered by Benbasat and Weber (1996) and Robey (1996). 
Questions of relevance to practice of IS research also fall into 
this category. Further, what is termed critical theory expli 
citly addresses ethical and moral questions, by seeking to be 
emancipatory and bring about improvements in the human 
condition (see Ngwenyama and Lee 1997). 
Returning to questions in the second category, discussion of 
the structural nature or ontological character of theory in 
Information Systems is scattered and there is scanty recog 
nition that these questions are even of interest. Here the word 
ontology is used in the sense that it refers to a language for 
talking about the nature and components of theory (for 
example, the different types of statements that are incor 
porated). Many IS researchers who use the word theory 
repeatedly in their work fail to give any explicit definition of 
their own view of theory. A number of papers that discuss 
different research paradigms (for example, Klein and Myers 
1999; Mingers 2001) offer little in the way of definitions or 
discussion of the nature of theory or types of knowledge that 
can be expected to result from different research approaches. 
Recognition that different types of theory exist can be found 
in some proponents of constructive or design theory (Iivari 
1983; Markus et al. 2002; Walls et al. 1992). A wider view 
on theory and knowledge types is found in only a handful of 
papers in IS (Cushing 1990; Gregor 2002a 2002b; Iivari 1983; 
Markus and Robey 1988). 
Table 1 presents examples of theories in IS of different onto 
logical types to demonstrate that multiple views of theory 
exist. These initial examples are presented briefly. Further 
delineation of these views and more is the raison d'etre of 
this essay. 
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I Table 1 Some Differing Views of Theory in Information Systems 
Theory as statements that say how something should be done in practice: 
An early textbook by Davis and Olson (1985) articulates the way in which MIS should be designed, implemented and 
managed. This theory provides prescriptions to be followed in practice, with the implicit expectation that the 
prescribed methods will in some sense be "better" than alternatives (Cushing 1990). 
Theory as statements providing a lens for viewing or explaining the world: 
Orlikowski and Robey (1991) drew on structuration theory and empirical work to construct a theory in which the 
organizational consequences of IT are viewed as the products of both material and social dimensions. Such theory 
is seen as a desirable end product; formal testing of such a theory is not envisaged (Walsham 1995). 
Theory as statements of relationships among constructs that can be tested: 
The technology acceptance model (Davis 1986) posits that two particular beliefs on the part of users, perceived 
usefulness and perceived ease-of-use, are of primary relevance for computer acceptance behaviors. This theory leads 
to testable propositions that can be investigated empirically (see Davis et al. 1989). 
Examination of what is meant by theory occurs in other 
disciplines. An issue of the Academy of Management Review 
(1989, Volume 14, Number 4), focused on theory and theory 
development. Similarly, an issue of Administrative Science 
Quarterly (1995, Volume 40, Number 3) contained articles 
about what theory is, what theory is not, and how theorizing 
occurs. Descriptions of theory in the social sciences can also 
be found in Dubin (1978), Freese (1980), Kaplan (1964), 
Merton (1967), and Weick (1989). More established disci 
plines have considerable histories of enquiry into the nature 
of theory. In the philosophy of science there has been discus 
sion of scientific knowledge and the formulation of theory 
over a very long period (for example, Hume 1748; Locke 
1689; Nagel 1979; Popper 1980). Fundamental ideas from 
this prior work are drawn upon in this essay, but they are 
adapted for the IS context. 
It is important to examine the nature of theory in IS separately 
from other disciplines as the four classes of questions 
depicted earlier are interrelated. The domain of interest for a 
discipline can be expected to influence the nature of its 
theory. Theory in mathematics and music, for example, 
means different things and knowledge is developed, specified, 
and used in different ways. Thus, the nature of theory in IS 
could differ from that found in other disciplinary areas. A 
characteristic that distinguishes IS from other fields is that it 
concerns the use of artifacts in human-machine systems. Lee 
(2001, p iii) uses these words: 
research in the information systems field examines 
more than just the technological system, or just the 
social system, or even the two side by side; in 
addition, it investigates the phenomena that emerge 
when the two interact. 
Thus, we have a discipline that is at the intersection of knowl 
edge of the properties of physical objects (machines) and 
knowledge of human behavior. IS can be seen to have com 
monalities with other design disciplines such as architecture 
or engineering, which also concern both people and artifacts, 
or with other applied disciplines such as medicine, where the 
products of scientific knowledge (such as drugs or treatments) 
are used with people. To understand IS, theory is required 
that links the natural world, the social world, and the artificial 
world of human constructions. Thus, the body of knowledge 
that is needed draws on natural science, social science and 
what has been termed design science (Cross 2001; Hevner et 
al. 2004; March and Smith 1995; Simon 1996). The attributes 
of such a body of knowledge are worthy of exploration, which 
is the aim of this essay. 
Thinking clearly about the nature of theory in Information 
Systems has significance for research and practice. Our 
leading journals expect that published research articles will 
have a strong grounding in theory (MISQ 2004). Developing 
theory is what we are meant to do as academic researchers 
and it sets us apart from practitioners and consultants. In 
addition, there is the view that "nothing is so practical as a 
good theory" (Lewin 1945). Theories are practical because 
they allow knowledge to be accumulated in a systematic man 
ner and this accumulated knowledge enlightens professional 
practice. 
MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 613 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Personal experience with doctoral students in particular 
suggests that they often have limited understanding of what is 
meant by theory. Exposure to conflicting or simplistic de 
scriptions of different research paradigms (for example, 
interpretivism versus positivism) sometimes leads to con 
fusion. The distinction made earlier among the different 
classes of questions about research suggests that pieces of the 
puzzle these novice researchers are facing are missing. The 
discussion of differences among paradigms is frequently 
framed around epistemology and the practice of doing 
research in a community and the possibility that there may be 
different types of theory appropriate in different circumstance 
is not explored. An initial premise for the paper is that 
different types of theory exist in Information Systems and that 
all can be valuable. The exploration of theory that follows 
has been framed to be inclusive and does not depend on the 
adoption of a specific epistemological commitment (that is, 
how knowledge is acquired and justified). The paper is 
intended to be of interest to a range of scholars with different 
personal preferences for research approaches. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, it 
considers general notions of theory in more detail, including 
different conceptions of causality, explanation, and generali 
zation, which are central to different ways of developing and 
expressing knowledge. An argument is made that an appro 
priate taxonomy for IS depends on classifying theories with 
respect to the degree and manner in which they address four 
central goals of theory: analysis, explanation, prediction and 
prescription. The five different types of IS theory distin 
guished are labeled: (1) theory for analyzing, (2) theory for 
explaining, (3) theory for predicting, (4) theory for explaining 
and predicting (EP theory), and (5) theory for design and 
action. The different types of theory are interrelated and some 
comprehensive, well-developed bodies of theory could 
include components from all the types of theory discussed. 
Illustrations of relevant work in IS are provided under each 
heading, as are related research methods (briefly), and the 
form a contribution to knowledge could take. The applica 
bility of the taxonomy is demonstrated by classifying a 
sample of articles from recent journal issues. The paper con 
cludes with a discussion of questions that arise from con 
sideration of these different views of Information Systems 
theory and suggestions for further work. 
About Theory H^H^HHHHHHIH 
This section presents underlying ideas relevant to theory to 
preface the subsequent discussion of theory in Information 
Systems. It is necessary to express these ideas to show the 
underlying philosophical positions on which the essay relies. 
Issues discussed include the nature of theory in general, the 
need for generalization, the nature of causality and the core 
goals of explanation and prediction. It is impossible in a 
single paper to condense the extensive discussion of these 
topics over many hundreds of years into a meaningful repre 
sentation of all that has been said. The approach adopted is 
to give an outline of the perspectives considered and to 
highlight those differences in thought that are intimately 
connected with different approaches to theory, as well as 
some important commonalities. 
A wide rather than a narrow view of theory is taken so that 
the subject matter of the essay is not restricted. Dictionary 
definitions show that the word theory can take on many 
meanings, including "a mental view" or "contemplation," a 
"conception or mental scheme of something to be done, or the 
method of doing it; a systematic statement of rules or prin 
ciples to be followed," a "system of ideas or statements held 
as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenom 
ena; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by 
observation or experiment, and is propounded or accepted as 
accounting for the known facts; statements of what are held 
to be the general laws, principles, or causes of something 
known or observed," a "mere hypothesis, speculation, conjec 
ture" (OED 2004). Thus, the word theory will be used here 
rather broadly to encompass what might be termed elsewhere 
conjectures, models, frameworks, or body of knowledge. 
Different Perspectives on Theory 
Differences in views of theory depend to some degree on 
philosophical and disciplinary orientations, yet there are also 
commonalities. This essay draws upon writings from the 
philosophy of the natural sciences, the social sciences, from 
the interpretivist tradition, and from the sciences of the arti 
ficial, all of which are relevant to Information Systems. 
In general, philosophers of science writing in the tradition of 
the physical or natural sciences are likely to see theory as 
providing explanations and predictions and as being test 
able. For example, Popper3 (1980) held that theorizing, in 
part, involves the specification of universal statements in a 
form that enables them to be tested against observations of 
Popper was an effective critic of Marxism and Freud's psychoanalytic 
theories and was the first insightful critic of logical positivism. Popper's 
contributions to the philosophy of science continue to be significant. 
Godfrey-Smith (2003) saw that he had an appeal to many working scientists 
and was regarded as a hero by many. Magee (1998, p. 256) places Popper 
among the leading philosophers of the 20th century, along with Russell, 
Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, and believes that there will be continued 
discovery and development of his positive views in comparison with his 
critiques. 
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what occurs in the real world. Popper described theory as 
follows (p. 59): 
Scientific theories are universal statements. Like all 
linguistic representations they are systems of signs 
or symbols. Theories are nets cast to catch what we 
call "the world"; to rationalize, to explain and to 
master it. We endeavor to make the mesh even finer 
and finer. 
Similar views of theory can be found in the social sciences. 
Doty and Glick (1994, p. 233), writing about typologies as a 
form of theory in organizational studies, thought that the 
minimal definition of a theory was that it must meet three pri 
mary criteria: (1) constructs must be identified; (2) relation 
ships among these constructs must be specified; and (3) these 
relationships must be falsifiable (that is, able to be tested). 
The philosophy of science offers a rich variety of views, 
which continue to develop (see Godfrey-Smith 2003). One 
specific and rather narrow position, that of logical positivism, 
has had a lingering influence on the manner in which theory 
is regarded by some philosophers of science. Logical positi 
vism was developed in Europe after World War I by what was 
known as the Vienna Circle. At the base of logical positivism 
is the famous Verification Principle: only assertions that are 
in principle verifiable by observation or experience can 
convey factual information. Experience was thought to be the 
only source of meaning and the only source of knowledge 
(Magee 1998). Many philosophers of science regard logical 
positivism as defunct (Passmore 1967) and Popper takes 
credit for "killing" it as early as 1934 (Popper 1986). 
However, traces of logical positivism can still be detected in 
the philosophy of science: for example, in the reluctance to 
refer to causality in theoretical statements (see Dubin 1978), 
causality not being directly observable. 
The intrepretivist tradition steers researchers toward a dif 
ferent outlook, where the primary goal is not to develop 
theory that is testable in a narrow sense (although its validity 
or credibility may still be assessed), but in 
understanding the complex world of lived experi 
ence from the point of view of those who live it. 
This goal is variously spoken of as an abiding con 
cern for the life world, for the emic point of view, 
for understanding meaning, for grasping the actor's 
definition of a situation, for Verstehen. The world of 
lived reality and situation-specific meanings that 
constitute the general object of investigation is 
thought to be constructed by social actors (Schwandt 
1994, p. 118). 
Many of the ideas in this approach stem from the German 
intellectual tradition of hermeneutics and the Verstehen tradi 
tion in sociology, from phenomenology and from critiques of 
positivism in the social sciences. Knowledge in this paradigm 
takes on a different perspective. 
Knowledge consists of those constructions about 
which there is a relative consensus (or at least some 
movement towards consensus) among those com 
petent (and in the case of more arcane material, 
trusted) to interpret the substance of the construc 
tion. Multiple "knowledges" can coexist when 
equally competent (or trusted) interpreters disagree 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, p. 113). 
A further approach to theory is evident when the concern is 
with the construction of technological artifacts. The classic 
work that treats technology or artifact design as a special 
prescriptive type of theory is Herbert Simon's The Sciences of 
the Artificial (1996) first published in 1969. Simon (p. xii) 
notes that in an earlier edition of his work he described a 
central problem that had occupied him for many years: 
How could one construct an empirical theory? 
I thought I began to see in the problem of artificiality 
an explanation of the difficulty that has been experi 
enced in filling engineering and other professions 
with empirical and theoretical substance distinct 
from the substance of their supporting sciences. 
Engineering, medicine, business, architecture and 
painting are concerned not with the necessary but 
with the contingent?not with how things are but 
with how they might be?in short, with design. 
An ontological position is adopted in this essay that is 
consistent with a number of these different conceptions of 
theory. Theory is seen as having an existence separate from 
the subjective understanding of individual researchers. This 
position corresponds to ideas expressed by both Habermas 
and Popper. Habermas (1984) recognizes three different 
worlds: the objective world of actual and possible states of 
affairs, the subjective world of personal experiences and 
beliefs, and the social world of normatively regulated social 
relations. These three worlds are related to Popper's Worlds 
1, 2, and 3 (Popper 1986). World 1 is the objective world of 
material things; World 2 is the subjective world of mental 
states; and World 3 is an objectively existing but abstract 
world of man-made entities: language, mathematics, knowl 
edge, science, art, ethics, and institutions. Thus, theory as an 
abstract entity belongs to World 3. An individual can have a 
subjective view of what a theory means, at which point an 
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understanding of the theory resides in a personal World 2. 
This essay, however, is concerned with theory as World 3 
entities, existing outside an individual mind (as, for example, 
in journal articles). 
To sum up, this discussion of different perspectives on theory 
at a general level shows theories as abstract entities that aim 
to describe, explain, and enhance understanding of the world 
and, in some cases, to provide predictions of what will happen 
in the future and to give a basis for intervention and action. 
The following sections explore the fundamental goals of 
explanation and prediction in more depth, as well as the 
related issues of causality and generality. 
Generalization 
A number of different views of theory are encompassed in 
this essay with a view to being inclusive. There is still a limit, 
however, to what is classed as theory. Abstraction and 
generalization about phenomenon, interactions, and causation 
are thought to be at the core of a theory. We do not regard a 
collection of facts, or knowledge of an individual fact or 
event, as theory. "Data are not theory" (Sutton and Staw 
1995, p. 374), although data may form the foundation for 
theoretical development. For this reason, the word knowledge 
when used in this essay does not refer to knowledge of 
specific events or objects, but means body of knowledge, or 
theoretical knowledge. 
Views differ on the degree to which generalization or 
universality is required in theory. Popper's (1980) view is 
that the natural sciences should aim at strictly universal 
statements and theories of natural laws (covering laws), 
although these laws can never be held with certainty.4 The 
notion of prediction entails some conception of generality. In 
order to predict what will happen in the future, we need a 
generalization that includes future events. 
The possibility of true "laws" similar to the laws of nature in 
social affairs is thought unlikely (Audi 1999, p. 705; Cook 
and Campbell 1979, p. 15; Hospers 1967, p. 232) primarily 
because of the very large number of conditions (Xn) that 
might impact on any outcome (Y). Nevertheless, we expect 
in the social sciences (and IS) that theory should still include 
generalizations to some degree. 
Examples of natural laws are Boyle's Law or the law of gravity or e= mc2. 
Popper showed these laws are not empirically verifiable, acknowledging that 
David Hume had made this observation two and a half centuries before. The 
problem is the problem of induction: from no finite number of observations, 
however large, can any unrestrictedly general conclusion be drawn that 
would be defensible in logic. 
Theories can be classified by their level of generalization. 
Meta-theory is at a very high level of abstraction and provides 
a way of thinking about other theories, possibly across 
disciplines. Giddens (1984) describes his structuration theory 
as being a meta-theory. Examples of theories of this nature in 
Information Systems are not readily apparent, although this 
essay is one example, being a "theory of theories," and 
Markus and Robey's (1988) work is another. Theories with 
sweeping generalizations that are relatively unbounded in 
space and time are referred to as grand theories (Bacharach 
1989). Weber argued that IS is in need of such powerful, 
general theories that recognizably belong to the discipline, a 
motivation for his work with Yair Wand on theories of 
representation (Weber 1997). 
The generality of a theory is also indicated by its breadth of 
focus (Neuman 2000). Substantive theory is developed for a 
specific area of inquiry, such as delinquent gangs, strikes, 
divorce, or race relations, based on analysis of observations 
and is contrasted with formal theory, which is developed for 
a broad conceptual area such as deviance, socialization, or 
power. Another term used is mid-range theory, referring to 
theory that is moderately abstract, has limited scope, and can 
easily lead to testable hypotheses. Merton (1968) saw mid 
range theory as particularly important for practice disciplines. 
Definition of the level of generality or scope of a theory 
includes specifying the boundaries within which it is ex 
pected to hold and providing the qualifying words, the modal 
qualifiers, that are used in theoretical statements (words like 
some, every, all, and always). For example, we could specify 
a theory about information system failure and say that it had 
boundaries in that it applied only to large and complex 
systems. A very general theory might have statements that 
applied to all systems, where "all" is a modal qualifier. 
The level of generality has not been used in this essay as a 
primary characteristic for distinguishing theory types. The 
processes by which generalizations are developed may differ 
with the tradition in which work is carried out (see Lee and 
Baskerville 2003), yet there appears to be reasonably wide 
acknowledgement among researchers of many persuasions 
that varying degrees of generality are possible in theories. 
Theories in each of the five theory types distinguished in this 
essay could be subjected to secondary classification on the 
basis of the level of generality to give a two-dimensional 
classification scheme?a potential area for further work. 
Causality 
The idea of causality, or the relation between cause and event, 
is central to many conceptions of theory. When theory is 
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taken to involve explanation, it is intimately linked to ideas of 
causation. Often, to ask for an explanation of an event is to 
ask for its cause. Similarly, the ability to make predictions 
from theory can depend on knowledge of causal connections. 
The concept of causality is extremely problematic but is of 
fundamental philosophical importance. The 18th century 
Scottish philosopher, David Hume, for example, pointed out 
that we are unable to see or prove that causal connections 
exist in the world, though we continue to think and act as if 
we have knowledge of them (Norton 1999, p. 400). Kant's 
(1781) position was that understanding in terms of cause and 
effect was an a priori characteristic of the human mind 
underlying all human knowledge. 
There are many ways of reasoning about causality and to 
some extent different types of theory reflect different ways of 
ascribing causality in the phenomena we observe around us 
and the different types of explanation that arise. An important 
point, however, is that the various arguments for causality are 
not mutually exclusive and at different times and in different 
circumstances we will rely on different reasons for ascribing 
causality. Four prominent approaches to the analysis of event 
causation can be distinguished (see Kim 1999): 
1. Regularity (or nomological) analysis. Universal regu 
larity gives rise to universal or covering laws. "There are 
some causes, which are entirely uniform and constant in 
producing a particular effect; and no instance has ever 
been found of any failure or irregularity in their in their 
operation" (Hume 1748, p. 206). This type of regularity 
is sought in the natural sciences, with examples of 
covering laws being Boyle's Law and Ohm's Law in 
physics. Many believe this type of regularity should not 
be expected or sought in the social sciences (for example, 
Little 1999). 
2. Counterfactual analysis. Under this approach, what 
makes an event a cause of another is the fact that if the 
cause had not occurred, the event would not have (the 
cause is a necessary condition). If counterfactuals are 
understood in terms of covering laws, then counterfactual 
analysis may turn into a form of regularity analysis. 
3. Probabilistic causal analysis. This type of causality was 
recognized by Hume (1748, p. 206) with an entertaining 
example. Compared to universal laws, "there are other 
causes, which have been found more irregular and uncer 
tain; nor has rhubarb always proved a purge, or opium a 
soporific to everyone, who has taken these medicines." 
This view of causal analysis is thought to be suited to the 
social sciences, where the lack of a closed system and the 
effects of many extraneous influences make other analy 
sis difficult to undertake. "To say that C is the cause of 
E is to assert that the occurrence of C, in the context of 
social processes and mechanisms F, brought about E, or 
increased the likelihood of E" (Little 1999, p. 705). 
4. Manipulation or teleological causal analysis. In this 
view, a cause is an event or state that we can produce at 
will, or otherwise manipulate to bring about a certain 
other event as an effect. This analysis relies on an every 
day understanding of a cause as an act by an intentional 
agent, for example, flicking a switch causes a light to 
turn on. 
Cook and Campbell (1979) give a more detailed coverage of 
causality, although they believe that "The epistemology of 
causation, and of the scientific method more generally, is at 
present in a productive state of near chaos" (p. 10). They 
present Mill's criteria for causality as being of practical use: 
(1) the cause has to precede the effect in time, (2) the cause 
and effect must be related, and (3) other explanations of the 
cause-effect relationship have to be eliminated. Pearl (2000) 
points out that statisticians (including Karl Pearson) have 
avoided or argued against the concept of causality altogether, 
because it is a mental construct that is not well-defined, pre 
ferring to deal only with correlations and contingency tables. 
Different approaches to theorizing concern themselves with 
causality to varying degrees and rely on different ways of 
reasoning about causality for explanations, as seen in the 
following section. 
Explanation and Prediction 
Central to many understandings of theory are the twin goals 
of explanation and prediction. These goals can be recognized 
in Popper's view of theory above, and also in the views of 
Nagel (1979), who sees the distinctive aim of the scientific 
enterprise as being theories that offer systematic and respon 
sibly supported explanations. 
Explanation is closely linked to human understanding, as an 
explanation can be provided with the intent of inducing a 
subjective state of understanding in an individual. The nature 
of explanations has been studied in the philosophy of science 
(see, for example, Achinstein 1983; Craik 1943; Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948; Nagel 1979), in relation to everyday 
reasoning and the nature of argumentation (see Toulmin 1958; 
Toulmin et al. 1979), as well as in the subbranches of IS 
relating to knowledge-based systems (see Gregor and 
Benbasat 1999). The relationship between scientific explana 
tion and human understanding is also a subject of interest 
(see, for example, Friedman 1974). 
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Approaches to explanation in the philosophy of science can 
be distinguished in terms of the underlying mode of reasoning 
about causality, and views on this matter have changed 
considerably over the last 50 years (Mayes 2004). Two broad 
approaches to offering explanations can be contrasted. First, 
a particular fact or event is explained by pointing out the 
scientific law that governs its occurrence. This "covering law 
theory of explanation" was developed by Hempel and Oppen 
heim (1948) and is a tenet of logical empiricist philosophy. 
To explain something is merely to show how to derive it in a 
logical argument from premises that include a covering law. 
A number of problems have been detected with this approach, 
one of which is the asymmetry problem, illustrated by the case 
of a flagpole and its shadow. The covering law approach 
gives an explanation of the length of the shadow from knowl 
edge of the height of the flagpole and the position of the sun, 
but it also supports an argument that the length of the shadow 
explains the height of the flagpole (and the position of the 
sun), which is rather an unsatisfying "explanation" in the 
common sense of the word (see Godfrey-Smith 2003). 
Later attempts at providing a better base for explanations have 
moved away from this logical conceptualization to include the 
notion that explanation is a communicative process (see, for 
example, Achinstein 1983). This second communicative 
school of thought argues that it is important for explanations 
to include notions of causality that do not depend on law-like 
generalizations or statistical association alone, but refer to 
other causal mechanisms including teleological-type causes. 
In the remainder of this essay, the terms explanation or causal 
explanation refer to this second wider view of explanation, 
rather than the narrower covering-law approach. 
The different views on causality and explanation are evident 
in different approaches to theory. On the one hand, Dubin 
(1978) specifically excludes causal relationships,5 stating that 
Empirically relevant theory in the behavioral and 
social sciences is built upon an acceptance of the 
notion of relationship rather than the notion of 
causality (p. 96). 
It is somewhat surprising to find these views in the latter part of Dubin's 
text. In an early chapter, Dubin describes clearly how a theory can contain 
propositions of two types (Dubin 1978, pp. 30-31): one for prediction of out 
comes and one for describing processes. He sees causal process-type state 
ments as useful in a chain of statements, to link and justify the outcome-type 
statements. However, he does not follow through with this view when 
specifying the components of theory, where he excludes process-type causal 
explanation. It is possible that a number of researchers who use Dubin as a 
reference do not agree with his view on the omission of causality from 
theory, or are not aware that it is a part of his arguments. 
Dubin assigns reasoning about causality in theory to 
"rhetoric" (p. 96) and rests his arguments in part on views 
expressed by an early 20th century physicist and philosopher 
of science, Pierre Duhem, who also held 
A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a 
system of mathematical propositions, deduced from 
a small number of principles, which aim to represent 
as simply, as completely, and exactly as possible a 
set of experimental laws (Duhem 1962, p. 7). 
Other philosophers of science offer a contrasting view of the 
role of explanations in theory. Nagel (1979) distinguishes 
theories from experimental laws, believing that theories are 
more comprehensive, whereas an experimental law can be a 
single statement. A theory is a system of interrelated state 
ments, possibly containing abstract theoretical terms that 
cannot be translated into empirical measures. The theory 
might also include statements about causality, with varying 
concepts of causality, including teleological causation, so that 
the theory provides causal explanations. 
Apart from explanations, theories can also aim at predictions, 
which allow the theory both to be tested and to be used to 
guide action. Prediction goes hand in hand with testing. For 
example, we can make a prediction "If a systems test is not 
carried out, then a system will fail." This proposition can 
both be tested against what happens in practice with projects, 
and also used to guide action, if it is believed to be accurate. 
Some theories can focus on one goal, either explanation or 
prediction, at the expense of the other. That is, it is possible 
to achieve precise predictions without necessarily having 
understanding of the reasons why outcomes occur. Using an 
everyday example, it is possible to predict from the appear 
ance of clouds that it about to rain, without having an under 
standing of how precipitation occurs. Moreover, it is possible 
to have models that are powerful in contributing to under 
standing of processes without providing, at the same time, 
precision in prediction. Case studies of information systems 
implementation might give us a good understanding of how 
lack of involvement of users can lead to user dissatisfaction 
with a completed system. It would still be difficult to predict 
with any degree of accuracy the degree of user dissatisfaction 
arising from lack of involvement over a wide range of 
systems and settings. Dubin refers to these situations as the 
precision paradox and the power paradox respectively. 
The distinction between the goals of explanation and predic 
tion is central to the differentiation among types of theory in 
the taxonomy proposed in this paper. 
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Classifying Theory in_ Information Systems 
A central question for this essay is how to construct a classi 
ficatory scheme for theories in Information Systems. 
McKelvey (1982) reviews a number of methods that have 
been proposed for the construction of taxonomies and illus 
trates his arguments in the context of organizational classi 
fication. This branch of enquiry is referred to as systematics 
(Simpson 1961) and dates back to the logical enquiries of 
Aristotle and Plato and their study of the hidden nature or 
form or essence of things. A difference between the illus 
trations of classificatory schema given by McKelvey and the 
objects of enquiry in this essay is that the former concerns the 
objects of natural and social science, such as organizations, 
plants, and animals, while the concern in this essay is with the 
structural nature of theories, which are abstract entities. The 
classification system proposed resulted from an iterative 
process involving the study of the nature of theories evident 
in IS, analysis of prior work, and refinement of an analytic 
classification method that distinguished among the classes of 
theory on the basis of their important attributes. Alternative 
methods would include forms of empirical classification, 
which could, for instance, involve the study of what forms of 
theory have occurred in IS publications over a period of time 
and allow groupings to emerge from this study on the basis of 
the characteristics of the theories observed, possibly using a 
statistical technique such as cluster analysis. An analytic 
method is adopted here as it is believed to be more suitable 
when the defining attributes of theory can be extracted from 
a considerable literature. 
The advantage gained by classifying objects of interest in a 
taxonomy is that like properties of a class of phenomena can 
be identified and a means is provided for comparing and 
contrasting classes. Identification of which class a proposed 
piece of work falls into provides some guidelines as to how 
the theory developed should look and how it can be evaluated. 
The criteria for evaluating classification schema and taxon 
omies should be considered (see Doty and Glick 1994). 
These theories (of Type I in the taxonomy) are expected to be 
complete and exhaustive; that is, they should include classes 
that encompass all phenomena of interest. There should be 
decision rules, which hopefully are simple and parsimonious, 
to assign instances to classes and the classes should be 
mutually exclusive. In addition, as taxonomies are proposed 
to aid human understanding, we would like the classes to be 
easily understood and to appear natural. 
The method for classifying theory for IS proposed here begins 
with the primary goals6 of the theory. Research begins with 
a problem that is to be solved or some question of interest. 
The theory that is developed should depend on the nature of 
this problem and the questions that are addressed. Whether 
the questions themselves are worth asking should be con 
sidered against the state of knowledge in the area at the time. 
The four primary goals of theory discerned are 
Analysis and description. The theory provides a descrip 
tion of the phenomena of interest, analysis of relation 
ships among those constructs, the degree of generaliza 
bility in constructs and relationships and the boundaries 
within which relationships, and observations hold. 
Explanation. The theory provides an explanation of how, 
why, and when things happened, relying on varying 
views of causality and methods for argumentation. This 
explanation will usually be intended to promote greater 
understanding or insights by others into the phenomena 
of interest. 
Prediction. The theory states what will happen in the 
future if certain preconditions hold. The degree of cer 
tainty in the prediction is expected to be only approxi 
mate or probabilistic in IS. 
Prescription. A special case of prediction exists where 
the theory provides a description of the method or 
structure or both for the construction of an artifact (akin 
to a recipe). The provision of the recipe implies that the 
recipe, if acted upon, will cause an artifact of a certain 
type to come into being. 
Combinations of these goals lead to the five types of theory 
shown in the left-hand column of Table 2. The distinguishing 
features of each theory type are shown in the right-hand 
column. It should be noted that the decision to allocate a 
theory to one class might not be straightforward. A theory 
that is primarily analytic, describing a classification system, 
can have implications of causality. For example, a framework 
that classifies the important factors in information systems 
development can imply that these factors are causally con 
nected with successful systems development. Some judge 
ment may be needed to determine what the primary goals of 
a theory are and to which theory type it belongs. 
A theory is an artifact in that it is something that would not exist in the real 
world without human intervention. The word goal here means the goal of the 
artifact in the sense that it is the causa finalis, the final cause or end of the 
artifact (following Aristotle's writing on the four explanations of any "thing" 
in The Four Causes, from a translation by Hooker 1993). The goal of a 
theory is "what the theory is for": analyzing, explaining, predicting, or 
prescribing. For a more commonplace artifact such as a table, the causa 
finalis is what the table is for (e.g., eating from). 
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Table 2. A Taxonomy of Theory Types in Information Systems Research 
Theory Type Distinguishing Attributes 
I. Analysis Says what is. 
The theory does not extend beyond analysis and description. No causal relationships among 
phenomena are specified and no predictions are made. 
II. Explanation Says what is, how, why, when, and where. 
The theory provides explanations but does not aim to predict with any precision. There are no 
testable propositions. 
III. Prediction Says what is and what will be. 
The theory provides predictions and has testable propositions but does not have well-developed 
justificatory causal explanations. 
IV. Explanation and Says what is, how, why, when, where, and what will be. 
prediction (EP) Provides predictions and has both testable propositions and causal explanations. 
V. Design and action Says how to do something. 
The theory gives explicit prescriptions (e.g., methods, techniques, principles of form and function) 
for constructing an artifact 
Table 3. Structural Components of Theory_I 
Theory Component 
(Components Common to All Theory) Definition 
Means of representation The theory must be represented physically in some way: in words, mathematical 
terms, symbolic logic, diagrams, tables or graphically. Additional aids for repre 
sentation could include pictures, models, or prototype systems. 
Constructs These refer to the phenomena of interest in the theory (Dubin's "units"). All of the 
primary constructs in the theory should be well defined. Many different types of 
constructs are possible: for example, observational (real) terms, theoretical 
(nominal) terms and collective terms.* 
Statements of relationship These show relationships among the constructs. Again, these may be of many 
types: associative, compositional, unidirectional, bidirectional, conditional, or 
causal. The nature of the relationship specified depends on the purpose of the 
theory. Very simple relationships can be specified: for example, "x is a member of 
class A." 
Scope The scope is specified by the degree of generality of the statements of relationships 
(signified by modal qualifiers such as "some," "many," "all," and "never") and 
statements of boundaries showing the limits of generalizations. 
Theory Component (Components 
Contingent on Theory Purpose) Definition 
Causal explanations The theory gives statements of relationships among phenomena that show causal 
reasoning (not covering law or probabilistic reasoning alone). 
Testable propositions (hypotheses) Statements of relationships between constructs are stated in such a form that they 
can be tested empirically. 
Prescriptive statements Statements in the theory specify how people can accomplish something in practice 
_(e.g., 
construct an artifact or develop a strategy)._ 
*Dubin (1978) defines a real unit as one for which an empirical indicator can be found, and a nominal unit as one for which an empirical indicator 
cannot be found. Collective units are a class or set of units while member units are the members of the class or set. Further distinctions are made 
between enumerative, associative, relational, statistical, and complex units. 
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Table 3 shows the components of theories across the tax 
onomy. This specification allows IS researchers (1) to 
identify what theory is composed of in general and (2) to 
analyze the components of their own theory and the theory of 
others. This framework is used in the following section for 
the analysis of examples of theories. 
Some components of theory are necessary for other compo 
nents. Each theory must have some means of representation.7 
The focus in this paper is on the structural analysis of theory 
that is accessible to more than one person, that is, it can be 
communicated. Thus, the means of representation for theory 
include words, either spoken or written, mathematical sym 
bols, operators from symbolic logic, diagrams, graphs, and 
other pictorial devices. It is possible that working models or 
prototypes could also be used to represent constructs or rela 
tionships. A single concept can have more than one physical 
representation: for example, the mathematical symbol 
"=" 
represents the same concept as the words "is equal to." Each 
theory must also have constructs, which refer to the entities 
that the theory concerns. These entities could be physical 
phenomena or abstract theoretical terms. All the other com 
ponents of theory depend on these basic components. 
Theoretical statements are composed of words or symbols that 
represent constructs (for example, e 
= 
mc2). Statements of 
relationship, scope, explanation, prediction, and prescription 
are all different types of statements. The active words, or 
verbs, in a statement will distinguish the type of statement. 
Membership of a class or category is indicated by words such 
as "belongs to" or "is a." Words such as "led to," "influ 
ences," or "constrains" imply causality. The terms "asso 
ciated with" and "linked" are frequently used but are less 
informative. They could mean "correlated with," "came 
before," "composed of," "located next to," or something else. 
Prescriptive statements can take an imperative form: "A 
system of type x should include functions a, b and c." 
The taxonomic method proposed can be compared with other 
taxonomies proposed for theory types on the basis of their 
structural character, although few systematic attempts at 
classifying theories across paradigms can be found. Fawcett 
and Downs (1986), working in the field of nursing, classified 
theories as descriptive, explanatory, or predictive. Their tax 
onomy, while being an influence on the current work, ex 
cludes prescriptive theory of the type needed for design and 
action and includes theory that is purely descriptive. Iivari 
(1983) distinguished three levels of theorizing for IS: (1) a 
conceptual level, at which the objects of enquiry are defined; 
This paragraph gives a very simple account of notions of representation, 
signs, and meaning, which are dealt with at great length elsewhere (e.g., in 
semiotics). 
(2) a descriptive level, at which the explanatory conjectures 
and hypotheses are generated and tested; and (3) a prescrip 
tive level, at which methods for constructing systems are put 
forward, with recommendations for their practical use. 
Iivari's views are congruent with what is proposed here, 
although presented with less detail and the distinctions among 
the levels are less fine-grained. 
Cushing (1990) distinguished frameworks, descriptions of 
facts, empirical generalizations, and theory as separate steps 
in a program of scientific research. His breakdown of steps 
has some similarities with the classification schema proposed 
here, except his steps are means toward a single form of 
"scientific theory," rather than each step being recognized as 
a legitimate form of theorizing in its own right. 
Markus and Robey (1988) also distinguished theory partly in 
structural terms, considering (1) the nature of the causal 
agency (technological, organizational or emergent); (2) the 
logical structure (whether variance or process theory); and 
(3) the level of analysis. The first dimension defines the 
adoption of a particular theoretical stance, rather than a meta 
theoretical dimension. The third dimension of level of analy 
sis is related to the degree of generality of a theory. As such, 
it is a possible candidate for classifying theory, potentially 
giving a two-dimensional classificatory schema. 
Markus and Robey's second dimension deserves further 
consideration, as there are divergent views on the nature of 
process-type theory and variance-type theory. In one view, 
variance-type theory is seen as possessing laws of interactions 
(relationships) such that 
1. Given variation in the values of a unit (A), 
2. what other units (B, C, ...K) can be linked to 
the first (by laws of interactions) 
2. so that the variance in values of the original unit 
(A) may be accounted for by the linked varia 
tions of values in the other units (B, C, ...K)? 
(Dubinl989,p. 92). 
Process theory is seen as offering 
An explanation of the temporal order in which a 
discrete set of events occurred, based on a story or 
historical narrative (Huber and Van de Ven 1995, p. 
vii). 
Some authors argue that process-theory and variance-theory 
should be kept separate. Mohr (1982) believed that the 
attempt to mix them constituted "a significant impediment, 
one source of the frustration of theory" (p. 37) and other 
writers have adopted this view (for example, Seddon 1997). 
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It is important to realize that Mohr presents some contro 
versial views, equating variance theory with the laws of 
nature?yet, as seen earlier, a number of philosophers, going 
back to Hume, have argued that the degree of regularity found 
in the laws of nature should not be adopted or sought in the 
social sciences (see Little 1999). Further, Mohr argues that 
variance theory has explanations of causality reliant on the 
identification of sufficient and necessary antecedent condi 
tions for an outcome. This view of causation presents a 
number of difficulties, including that of the asymmetry of 
causation as discussed under the covering-law model of 
explanation, and also the problem that the identification of 
necessary and sufficient conditions is considered unlikely in 
"open" systems such as social systems, compared with the 
relatively "closed" systems found in the experimental 
sciences. An alternative view sees process and variance 
theorizing (as defined by Dubin rather than Mohr) as inter 
related, with both necessary for developing satisfying and 
sound theory and arguing for causality in different ways. 
Research might carry out process-type case studies of the 
context, content, and settings in which information systems 
are introduced and isolate some of the more important condi 
tions and events that lead to various outcomes. Variance-type 
studies could further investigate the degree of the relation 
ships among the identified events, conditions and outcomes 
using statistical techniques and larger samples (for a fuller 
explanation of this view, see Huber and Van de Ven 1995).8 
Lee, Barua and Whinston (1997) discussed theory in IS in 
terms of underlying causal relationships, but primarily from 
a statistical viewpoint, which gives a narrower focus than that 
of this essay. 
The current taxonomy builds on the prior work on the struc 
tural nature of theory in IS. It is regarded as an advance, 
however, as it offers a fuller and more systematic basis for 
classifying theory. 
Note that some further distinctions among theories in the 
literature do not depend on the structural nature of the theory. 
Rather, different theory types are distinguished depending on 
their association with particular epistemological positions or 
with particular socio-political aims. The distinctions made 
concern the third and fourth classes of questions distinguished 
in the introduction rather than the second. Thus, we find 
theories identified by their origin or research method; for 
example, grounded theory refers to theory that emerges from 
the grounded theory method, which involves close and careful 
g 
The view that process and variance explanations can coexist in one theory 
does not mean that it is a simple matter to draw a box-diagram model 
representing the theory as a whole, or that both process and variance com 
ponents can easily be tested in a single study (see also the views of DeLone 
and McLean (2003) in their re-specification of their success model). 
analysis of data (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Similarly, theory 
can be referred to as deductive, meaning that it has been 
deduced from an existing body of theory, or inductive, 
meaning that it is derived from data. 
Critical theory seeks to bring about improvements in the lives 
of human actors. Theory labeled normative has an ethical or 
moral dimension in addressing what should be done. 
Normative theory differs from theory for design and action 
(Type V) in that the latter does not imply that one course of 
action is better than another in a moral or ethical sense. 
Again, all of the theory types depicted here could have social 
or political implications. The mere act of classifying people 
or things into groups and giving them names ("black" versus 
"white") can give rise to stereotypical thinking and have 
political and social consequences (see Foucault 1971). 
However, while attributes of theory that relate to epistemol 
ogical and socio-political questions are very real and 
important, they are beyond the scope of the current work, 
which focuses on the structural aspects of theory. 
The following sections describe the five different types of 
theory that are identified as germane to IS. 
Five Types of Theory in 
Information Systems WtK^BKtKKKKK^tk 
A detailed description of each type of theory follows, with 
examples as illustrations. There is some variation within each 
theory type, with different types of work depending on the 
focus of work undertaken and the scope of the theory. The 
examples given for each theory type are analyzed for evi 
dence of all seven theory components identified earlier: 
means of representation, constructs, relationships, scope, 
causal explanations, falsifiable statements, and prescriptive 
statements. This analysis of existing work is not straight 
forward, as theories are rarely presented explicitly in terms of 
these seven components and some interpretive licence has 
been employed in presenting the examples. In addition, as 
noted earlier, the classification is dependent on the main or 
primary goals of the theory, rather than goals that are present 
only to a minor degree. For example, a theory that focused 
primarily on prediction yet had some explanations of a very 
rudimentary type would be classified as Type III. 
Type I: Theory for Analyzing 
Analytic theories analyze "what is" as opposed to explaining 
causality or attempting predictive generalizations. These 
theories are 
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Table 4 An Example of a Taxonomic Theory 
Theory Overview 
Iivari, Hirschheim and Klein (2000-2001) propose a dynamic framework for classifying IS development approaches and 
methodologies. The framework is intended to serve as an organizing and simplifying device that contributes to methodology 
comparisons by pointing out similarities and differences between them. 
Theory Component Instantiation 
Means of representation Words, diagrams, tables. 
Primary constructs Paradigms, approaches, methodologies, and techniques. 
Statements of relationship The four tiers of the framework are comprised of paradigms, approaches, 
methodologies, and techniques. Entities at one level are represented as inheriting 
the features of the class to which they belong at the next level of abstraction in the 
framework, allowing the recognition and modeling of genealogical dependencies of j 
methodologies. 
Scope Methodologies that have been proposed in the scholarly literature. A procedure for 
including new methodologies as they arise is proposed. 
Causal Explanations Not present. 
Testable propositions Not present. 
Prescriptive statements_ Not present._ 
the most basic type of theory. They describe or 
classify specific dimensions or characteristics of 
individuals, groups, situations, or events by sum 
marizing the commonalities found in discrete 
observations. They state "what is." Descriptive 
theories are needed when nothing or very little is 
known about the phenomenon in question (Fawcett 
and Downs 1986, p. 4). 
Fawcett and Downs referred to these theories as descriptive, 
but this term is not entirely appropriate as this class of 
theories goes beyond basic description in analyzing or sum 
marizing salient attributes of phenomena and relationships 
among phenomena. The relationships specified are classi 
ficatory, compositional, or associative, not explicitly causal. 
Variants of this theory type are referred to as classification 
schema, frameworks, or taxonomies. McKelvey (1982) 
gives a comprehensive coverage of the subject of tax 
onomies and classification for organizations under the 
heading of systematics, drawing upon work in biology, 
zoology, and botany, where the challenges for systematics 
are immense. He sees this kind of science as "the science 
of diversity" (p. 12). McKelvey points out the importance 
of systematics as a prerequisite to good scientific method, 
in providing clear delineation of the uniformities of classes 
of phenomena to be studied. 
The term typology is used more or less synonymously for 
taxonomy and classifications, although Doty and Glick 
(1994) argue that its use should be restricted to the special 
case where there is a conceptually derived interrelated sets 
of ideal types. They argue that these typologies are in 
tended to predict variance in dependent variables, because 
for organizations, the types identified are developed with 
respect to a specified organizational outcome. In this case, 
as the ideal types are developed with the intention of 
explaining or predicting outcomes through falsifiable rela 
tionships, the Doty and Glick typology is an example of 
theory Type III or IV in the taxonomy. 
Frameworks, classification schema, and taxonomies are 
numerous in IS. A classic early case is Gorry and Scott 
Morton's (1971) framework for management information 
systems. Table 4 gives a more recent example. Other 
examples of theorizing in this category include research on 
the delineation of constructs and their associated measures. 
For example, Davis' work on defining and measuring ease 
of-use and usefulness analyzed the properties that defined 
these constructs and allowed them to be measured (Davis 
1989). Some examples of grounded theory can also be 
examples of Type I theory, where the grounded theory 
method gives rise to a description of categories of interest. 
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What constitutes a contribution to knowledge with theory of 
this type? Theory that describes and analyses is valuable, 
as stated above, when little is known about some phenom 
ena. Any evidence gathered would be expected to have 
credibility. Descriptions presented should correspond as far 
as possible to "what is" (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
Further evaluation depends on the subtype of the theory. 
The evaluative criteria for classification schema have been 
mentioned before. If any classification system is developed, 
implicit claims are that the classification system is useful in 
aiding analysis in some way, that the category labels and 
groupings are meaningful and natural,9 and that hierarchies 
of classification are appropriate (most important divisions 
are shown at the highest level). The logic for the placement 
of phenomena into categories should be clear, as should the 
characteristics that define each category. In addition, 
important categories or elements should not be omitted from 
the classification system, that is, it should be complete and 
exhaustive. A previous classification system could be re 
vised as new entities come to light, or some preferable way 
of grouping or naming categories is identified. A judgement 
as to the degree to which the theory satisfies these criteria 
allows one to assess the contribution to knowledge. 
Type II: Theory for Explaining 
This type of theory explains primarily how and why some 
phenomena occur. These theories are formulated in such a 
way, however, that making testable predictions about the 
future is not of primary concern. Explanations of how, 
when, where, and why events occurred may be presented, 
giving rise to process-type theory. This class could well be 
labeled theory for understanding, as these theories often 
have an emphasis on showing others how the world may be 
viewed in a certain way, with the aim of bringing about an 
altered understanding of how things are or why they are as 
they are. 
At least two subtypes of work may be distinguished here. 
In the first, theory is used as a "sensitizing device" at a high 
level to view the world in a certain way (Klein and Myers 
1999, p. 75). DiMaggio (1995, p. 391) describes theory as 
enlightenment, where theory serves as 
Q 
Foucault (1971, p. xv, citing Borges) gives a striking example of a 
taxonomy that violates our innate sense of order. A "certain Chinese 
encyclopedia" is reputed to have written that "animals are divided into: 
(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, 
(e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classi 
fication, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camel-hair 
brush, (1) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from 
a long way off look like flies." 
A device of sudden enlightenment. From this 
perspective theory is complex, defamilarizing, rich 
in paradox. Theorists enlighten not through con 
ceptual clarity... but by startling the reader into 
satori. The point of theory, in this view, is not to 
generalize, because many generalizations are 
widely known and rather dull. Instead, theory is a 
"surprise machine"...a set of categories and 
domain assumptions aimed at clearing away con 
ventional notions to make room for artful and 
exciting insights. 
High-level Type II theories include structuration theory, an 
understanding of the world as reciprocal relationships 
between action and social structure (Giddens 1984), actor 
network theory, an understanding of inanimate objects and 
material systems as actors or co-agents of human intentional 
actors (Latour 1991) and the situated-action perspective, a 
model that contrasts routine activity situated in an environ 
ment with theories of deliberative action (Agre 1995). 
In a second subtype of theory for explaining at a lower 
level, explanations are given for how and why things 
happened in some particular real-world situation. Many 
case studies fall into this category. A nice example from 
history could be a case study of Napoleon's march on 
Moscow. Such a case study could analyze the causal 
factors that contributed to a military defeat (such as cam 
paigning in winter without good supply lines). Similarly, 
case studies of failure in IS can give a good understanding 
of what not to do when building systems. For example, an 
analysis of three case studies of fairly catastrophic IS 
failures showed that, in all cases, there had been a lack of 
managerial attention to recognized IT governance and 
project management principles (Avison et al. 2006). 
It can be seen that forms of this type of theory correspond 
reasonably closely to some views of theory in the inter 
pretivist paradigm (Klein and Myers 1999), although other 
interpretive theory is framed in such a way that it includes 
testable propositions, making it possibly Type IV. Table 5 
shows an example of theory for explaining in IS that fits the 
interpretivist paradigm, where the theory itself is an end 
product and is not expected to lead to predictive, deter 
ministic theory. 
Research approaches that can be used to develop this type 
of theory include case studies (Yin 1994), surveys, ethno 
graphic, phenomenological, and hermeneutic approaches 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994), and interpretive field studies 
(Klein and Myers 1999). 
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| Table 5 Example of Theory for Explaining 
Theory Overview 
Orlikowski (1992) developed a new theoretical model, the structurational model of technology, which made the claim that 
technology is both constituted by human agency and constitutes human practice. 
Theory Component Instantiation 
Means of representation Words, diagrams, tables. 
Primary constructs Technology, with various conceptions in terms of both its scope and role. Structural features 
of organization, including rules and resources. 
Statements of relationship An example: 
Technology is an outcome of such human action as design, development, 
appropriation, and modification (p. 410). 
Scope The statements of relationships include no modal qualifiers. A very high level of generality 
is suggested. No boundaries to the theory are stated. 
Causal Explanations The statements of relationship include causal explanations, for example: 
Technology facilitates and constrains human action through the provision of 
interpretative schemes, facilities and norms (p. 410). 
Testable propositions Not present. It is stated (p. 423) that the model should not be applied deterministically. 
Prescriptive statements Not present. 
What constitutes a contribution to knowledge with theory of 
this type? The theory developed, or the conjectures, need to 
be new and interesting, or to explain something that was 
poorly or imperfectly understood beforehand. With case 
studies, more than just a "story" is expected, as to qualify as 
theorizing the exercise must lead to conclusions with some 
generality. Klein and Myers (1999, p. 75) argue that with 
interpretive field studies there is a philosophical basis for 
abstraction and generalization: 
Unique instances can be related to ideas and 
concepts that apply to multiple situations. Never 
theless, it is important that theoretical abstractions 
and generalizations should be carefully related to the 
field study details as they were experienced and/or 
collected by the researcher. 
Again, we expect plausibility and credibility of any accounts 
given of events in the real world and justification for 
generalization. An aim of this type of theory is to explain 
how and why events happened as they did; therefore, we 
expect any ascriptions of causality to be made very carefully. 
The identification of a cause is subject to the same set of 
difficulties as with other research approaches. Possible alter 
native explanations as to what caused a particular outcome 
should be examined and assessed (internal validity). 
Judgment regarding the contribution to knowledge for this 
type of theory is made primarily on the basis of whether new 
or interesting insights are provided, and also on the basis of 
plausibility, credibility, consistency, and transferability of the 
arguments made. 
Type III: Theory for Predicting 
Theories aiming at prediction say what will be but not why; 
parts of the system remain a "black box." These theories are 
able to predict outcomes from a set of explanatory factors, 
without explaining the underlying causal connections between 
the dependent and independent variables in any detail. There 
are several reasons for leaving part of the system a black box. 
First, the focus of the theoretical model could be on predic 
tion, because that is the theorist's primary interest and 
detailed explanation of lower-level supporting mechanisms 
are thought unnecessary. Some economists admit that they 
are not so concerned if the assumptions underlying their 
theory are implausible, so long as they get high predictive 
power (Friedman 1953). Second, reasons to justify the ascrip 
tion of causality in regularity relationships might not yet have 
been uncovered. Captain Cook theorized to good practical 
effect that regular intakes of citrus fruits helped prevent 
scurvy, without knowing exactly why this was so. Others 
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would use the labels empirical generalizations (Cushing 1990; 
Kaplan 1964) or experimental laws (Nagel 1979) for this 
category rather than theory. Third, a leaning toward this type 
of theory can be detected in the logical positivist view that 
theory should not include statements of causality (explana 
tions) (Dubin 1978; Duhem 1962). 
Examples of this type of theory in IS do not come readily to 
hand, suggesting that they are not common. One example that 
is related to IS is Moore's Law. In 1965, Gordon Moore of 
Intel suggested that the number of transistors, and thus the 
power, of an integrated circuit would double every two years, 
while the cost remained the same. Moore later revised this 
estimate to a doubling every 18 months. Table 6 presents this 
example. Further examples are the algorithmic approaches to 
software cost estimation, including the COCOMO model, 
where the cost model is developed from empirical observa 
tion. Many of the mathematical formulae included have an 
exponential component, as experience has shown that costs do 
not normally increase linearly with size (Sommerville 2001). 
Examples are more common in finance and econometric 
studies, where the researcher appears to choose independent 
variables because they increase the R2 in a regression analysis, 
rather than for any other reason. Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1996, 
p. 138) in developing models of value creation from IT note 
that they improved the fit of the models by "adding commonly 
used control variables." A further example provides elabora 
tion. Organizational size is used to predict organizational 
innovativeness, this variable having consistently been found 
to be positively related to innovativeness (Rogers 1995). 
However, many studies offer little or no supportive analysis 
or justification of their use of organizational size as a predic 
tor variable; that is, they give no causal explanation for its 
inclusion. Organizational size could be a surrogate for several 
dimensions that lead to innovation, including organizational 
resources, organization levels and economies of scale (Goode 
2002). 
Associated research approaches include statistical techniques 
such as correlational or regression analysis and data mining. 
Correlational work can be longitudinal; that is, we can show 
how Y varies with a number of independent variables (X1? 
X2 ...) over a time period. Correlation studies can also be 
multidirectional; that is we can say larger values of X are 
related to larger values of Y, and also larger values of Y are 
related to larger values of X (as in height and weight of the 
population). Neural net techniques allow models to be 
constructed that give an accurate prediction of outcomes from 
input variables, although the reasons for the weightings 
applied to input values are not transparent. 
What constitutes a contribution to knowledge with theory of 
this type? The discovery of regularities that allow prediction 
can be of interest if these were unknown before, especially if 
the theory's predictive power is of considerable practical 
importance, as in the prediction of share prices in finance and 
in predicting the weather. The methods used to develop and 
test this theory are primarily quantitative, so rigor is expected 
in statistical design and methods. 
The limitations of this type of theory should be recognized. 
The existence of regularities or correlations between two vari 
ables does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. Height 
and weight are related but one does not cause the other. The 
number of ice creams sold at beaches has a strong positive 
relationship with the frequency of shark attacks. We would 
not conclude that ice cream eating caused shark attacks. In 
both cases, a third variable, which is a determinant of both, is 
of more interest. This variable is temperature, with higher 
temperatures leading to more people at beaches and more 
people in the water where they can be attacked by sharks. 
In addition, our practice can improve if we understand why 
two variables are related. Use of a proxy such as organi 
zational size, although it may have high predictive power in 
many circumstances, can lead to inconsistent results (Goode 
2001). From a pragmatic viewpoint, we are interested in 
which variables can be manipulated to bring about an out 
come, so we need to know where causal relationships exist. 
Organizational size could be less easy to manipulate than 
organizational resources, which may be the "real" pre 
condition for innovation. 
Type IV: Theory for Explaining and 
Predicting (EP Theory) 
This type of theory says what is, how, why, when, and what 
will be, and corresponds to commonly held views of theory in 
both the natural and social sciences, (although Type III theory 
is thought to be the natural-science type model by others). It 
is difficult to find an appropriate short label for this theory 
class without resorting to nomenclature such as "scientific 
type" theory, which is not appropriate because of the con 
flicting views within the philosophy of science. Thus, this 
class will be referred to as EP theory. EP theory implies both 
understanding of underlying causes and prediction, as well as 
description of theoretical constructs and the relationships 
among them. 
Type IV theories include "grand theories" such as general 
system theory (Ashby 1956; von Bertanlanffy 1973) and the 
related information theory of Shannon (1948). General 
system theory provides a very high-level way of thinking 
about many of the open systems of interest in IS. Open sys 
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Table 6. Example of Theory for Predicting 
Theory Overview 
Moore's law (1965) proposed that as technology evolved, larger and larger circuit functions could be crammed onto a single 
semiconductor substrate, meaning costs would continue to fall. 
Theory Component Instantiation 
Means of representation Words, graph. 
Primary constructs | Semiconductor integrated circuits, silicone base materials, cost per component in a 
| circuit. 
Statements of relationships The complexity (number of components per integrated circuit) for minimum component 
cost will increase at a rate of roughly a factor of two per year. 
Scope Stated as a general law using the modal qualifier "roughly" for the rate of increase. 
Assumed that silicone was likely to remain the base material for the semiconductor 
circuits. Expected that the relationship would hold for about 10 years. 
Causal Explanations The general nature of the relationship between improved technology and lower costs is 
explained, but there is no causal explanation as to why the power doubles. This factor 
was determined empirically by plotting the graph of the log of the number of components I 
per integrated function against the year from 1959 to 1965. j 
Testable propositions Yes. The predicted relationship could be tested. 
Prescriptive statements_ 
Not 
present._ 
Table 7 Example of a Theory for Explaining and Predicting 
Theory Overview 
Bhattacherjee and Premkumar (2004) proposed a theory that shows the causative drivers and emergent mechanisms driving 
temporal changes in user beliefs and attitude toward IT usage. This theory builds on expectation-disconfirmation theory and 
the technology acceptance model. 
Theory Component Instantiation 
Means of representation Words, diagrams. 
Primary constructs Antecedent conditions, beliefs, attitude, disconfirmation, satisfaction, intentions 
Statements of relationships An example: 
Perceived usefulness and attitude in a pre-usage stage are linked with those in 
the usage stage. 
Scope The theoretical model is given in a very general form; boundaries are not stated and the 
hypotheses have no modal qualifiers. In testing, only one usage-related belief (perceived 
j I usefulness) was examined, student subjects were used and the technologies examined 
were computer-based training and rapid application development software. 
Causal Explanations Yes. See p. 234: 
We hypothesize usage-stage belief as the joint outcome of pre-usage belief and 
disconfirmation, and usage-stage attitude as being determined jointly by pre- j 
usage attitude and satisfaction. 
Testable propositions Yes. The theory was tested through statistical methods and with qualitative data. 
Prescriptive statements Not the main thrust, although recommendations for practice are given. I 
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terns are seen as being in a continuous state of exchange with 
their environment and interacting with other systems outside 
of themselves. They are modeled in terms of the familiar con 
cepts of input, throughput, output, feedback, boundary, and 
environment. General system theory provides testable propo 
sitions, such as the law of requisite variety: only variety in a 
system's responses can keep down variety in outcomes when 
the system is subjected to a set of disturbances (Ashby 1956). 
Ashby gives very detailed explanations as to why this law 
applies to many systems. General system theory has com 
monalities with other high-level approaches to theory include 
cybernetics, the soft systems approach, and complex systems. 
Further examples of type IV theory can be distinguished. The 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis et al. 1989) 
and DeLone and McLean's dynamic model of information 
success (1992 2003) both aim to explain and predict. Weber 
(1997) gives a theory of representation, which aims to model 
the desirable properties of information systems at a deep level 
and be a theory native to IS. 
Doty and Glick (1994) show how typologies can be another 
form of Type IV theory, citing the example of Miles and 
Snow (1978), who describe the prospector, analyzer and 
defender types as ideal types of organization that are maxi 
mally effective. Organizations that resemble more closely 
any one of the ideal types are predicted to be more effective. 
Table 7 gives a further example of EP theory. 
Investigation of how authors specify EP theory in practice 
proves interesting. In many cases, it appears authors have not 
quite made up their mind as to whether causality is allowable 
in a theory or not, or where it can properly be mentioned. In 
specifying the theory or conceptual background in a paper, it 
is common to give a web of interrelated definitions and causal 
statements that comprise the theory. Bhattacherjee and 
Premkumar's (2004) description of expectation-disconfirma 
tion theory is an example, relying explicitly on causal 
reasoning and using words such as change and determine and 
mentioning a process model. These authors have research 
hypotheses that are also stated in causal terms. In other 
research articles, the language changes in specifying a 
research model, propositions, and hypotheses so that any hint 
of causality is eliminated. Instead, vague words such as 
associated with or linked to, rather than the stronger words 
influences, leads to, or determines, which are explicitly 
causal. In the interests of developing stronger and clearer 
theory of this type, the author believes researchers should 
make their commitment clear and couch their propositions in 
terms that show what they really mean: that is, use statements 
such as "Failure to perform a systems test can be a cause of 
systems failure." 
Many research methods can be used to investigate aspects of 
the EP theory type, including case studies, surveys, archival 
studies, experiments, the grounded theory approach, quasi 
experiments, statistical analysis, and field studies. Although 
the problems with terminology were noted earlier, this type of 
theory can have contributions from both process studies, 
which look at the unfolding of events over time, and variance 
studies, which look at the degree to which one variable can 
predict changes in another variable (Huber and Van de Ven 
1995). Note also that with this type of theory it is legitimate 
to have an overall dynamic theory (with feedback loops as in 
general system theory), yet test hypotheses deduced from the 
theory in cross-sectional (variance) studies. 
What constitutes a contribution to knowledge with theory of 
this type? Studies can usefully contribute to either theory 
building or theory testing. Many authors provide discussion 
of how "scientific" knowledge should be generated and tested 
(for example, Cook and Campbell 1979; Popper 1980) and a 
long list of potential criteria for "good theory" can be formed, 
including clarity, parsimony, elegance, internal consistency, 
agreement with evidence, absence of disconfirmation, sound 
ness of argument, internal and external validity, and consis 
tency with other theory. 
Type V: Theory for Design and Action 
This type of theory says how to do something. It is about the 
principles of form and function, methods, and justificatory 
theoretical knowledge that are used in the development of IS 
(Gregor 2002a; Gregor and Jones 2004; Walls et al. 1992). 
There are diverging views on the status of design theory and 
its relationship to other types of theory. Relevant work can be 
found, although it is scattered and appears under different 
labels. Associated research has been referred to as software 
engineering research (Morrison and George 1995), as a 
constructive type of research (Iivari 1991; Iivari et al. 1998), 
as prototyping (Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998), as a 
systems development approach (Burstein and Gregor 1999; 
Lau 1997; Nunamaker et al. 1990-91), and as design science 
(Hevner et al. 2004 March and Smith 1995; Simon 1996). 
It is clear that work of this type occupies an important place 
in IS. A review by Morrison and George (1995) of three 
leading management IS journals showed that software 
engineering related research represented about 45 percent of 
the IS articles found in the 6-year period from 1986 to 1991. 
Of the five bodies of knowledge identified by Davis (2000) as 
being unique or somewhat unique to IS, two relate to what 
could be termed design science: IS development processes 
and IS development concepts. 
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Design science has been given validity in IS through the work 
of March and Smith (1995), who developed a framework to 
demonstrate the relationship, activities and outputs of design 
and natural science research. March and Smith (1995) saw 
four products of design science: constructs, models, methods, 
and implementations. These authors, however, saw the term 
theory as the preserve of natural science. These ideas are 
further developed in Hevner et al. (2004), where the "artifact 
itself is emphasized as the prime or only contribution of 
design science, although it is recognized that the contributions 
of design science can include foundational constructs, models 
and methods for the design science knowledge base, and 
evaluation methods and metrics. Still, the focus of this work 
is on design as an activity, rather than the problem of what a 
special design-type theory might look like. 
In contrast, the notion of design theory has been adopted by 
Markus et al. (2002) in specifiying a design theory for knowl 
edge management systems (see Table 8). Other examples of 
design theory include methodologies?for example, struc 
tured systems analysis methods (Gane and Sarson 1979) and 
Multiview (Avison and Wood-Harper 1990)?and prescrip 
tions for building specific applications?for example, decision 
support systems as in Turban and Aronson (2001). Codd's 
(1970) theory of relational database design is a further 
example. 
Discussion of research approaches for this theory type can be 
found in Burstein and Gregor (1999), Hevner et al. (2004), 
March and Smith (1995), and Nunamaker et al. (1990-91). 
Action research is seen as particularly appropriate 
(Baskerville and Wood-Harper 1998). In support of this 
view, Lau's (1997) review of action research in IS studies 
over a 25 year period showed that 11 of the 30 articles 
reviewed were categorized as "systems development," 
covering the areas of analysis, design, development and 
implementation of IS and decision support systems. The case 
study was the preferred method of investigation. Iivari et al. 
(1998) argue for the particular importance of these methods 
for applied disciplines, such as IS and computer science. 
What constitutes a contribution to knowledge with theory of 
this type? March and Smith and Hevner et al. point out some 
conditions under which they believe a contribution to knowl 
edge in design science has occurred. Their criteria include 
utility to a community of users, the novelty of the artifact, and 
the persuasiveness of claims that it is effective. Models and 
methods can be evaluated for completeness, simplicity, 
consistency, ease of use, and the quality of results obtained 
through use of the method. Simon sees "interestingness" as 
a valid claim. 
Interrelationships among Theory Types 
Figure 1 depicts graphically the interrelationships among the 
classes of theory. The most basic type of theory, analytic 
theory, is necessary for the development of all of the other 
types of theory. Clear definition of constructs is needed in all 
theory formulation. Both theory for explaining and theory for 
predicting can sow seeds for the development of EP theory 
that encompasses both explanation and prediction. Design 
theory can be informed by all the other classes of theory. A 
design methodology can build on particular idiographic 
studies of what has worked in practice, on predictive relation 
ships that are known but not fully understood (such as the 
relationship between organizational size and innovativeness), 
and on fully developed EP theories such as those relating to 
data representation or human behavior. 
Design theory and EP theory are strongly interrelated. 
Knowledge of people and information technology capabilities 
informs the design and development of new information 
system artifacts. These artifacts can then be studied in terms 
of EP theory: what impacts do the artifacts have in the work 
place and in society. Note that there are many examples in 
the history of science of the interaction between scientific 
knowledge and technologies. The invention of the telescope 
allowed Galileo to make astronomical observations and 
confirm predictions made from theory about the phases of 
Venus (Gribbin 2002). Yet, a design theory for a telescope 
relies on knowledge of optics for its design principles. 
Some broad bodies of theory include all classes of theory and 
are perhaps most likely to be found in monographs. An 
example is the work on electronic markets by Ajit Kambil and 
Eric van Heck and their colleagues at Erasmus University in 
Rotterdam, which is described in a series of research articles 
and the monograph Making Markets (Kambil and van Heck 
2002). This body of theory includes Type I theory. A frame 
work was developed showing 11 key market processes that 
are related to the execution of trading of any kind (pp. 26-28). 
Key insights that "resonate time and again throughout the 
book" are Type II theory, for example, "Electronic markets 
are not technological interactions supported by humans. They 
are human interactions supported by technology" (p. 3). 
Further Type II theory is represented by the insights from the 
numerous case studies included. A study by Jochem Paarle 
burg is an example of Type III theory (p. 69). This study 
examined 194 consumer Web auctions in 8 countries and 
developed an index for the maturity of each in terms of trade 
processes. Statistical analysis showed that auctions with a 
higher level of maturity had a higher transaction volume. The 
authors note this correlation, but do not attribute causality. 
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Table 8 Example of a Theory for Design and Action 
Theory Overview 
Markus et al. (2002) proposed a design theory for systems that support emergent knowledge processes. 
Theory Component Instantiation 
Means of representation Words, tables, screen shots, diagrams. 
Primary constructs Users, work context, information requirements, system architecture, system processes (and 
more). 
Statements of relationships An example: 
Design for customer engagement by seeking out naive users (p. 188), 
that is, involvement of naive users leads to a greater degree of customer engagement. 
Scope Systems that support emergent knowledge processes. 
Causal Explanations Underlying micro or kernel theories that explain the design include an understanding of the 
nature of emergent knowledge processes. One requirement of these processes is that 
general expert knowledge must be contextualized when making decisions, something that 
familiar expert systems are unlikely to supply, so that supplementation by personal 
communication systems should be considered. 
Testable propositions The claim is made that the design theory will assist designers of other systems with similar 
requirements. 
Prescriptive statements The design theory specifies the meta-requirements addressed by the theory and gives a set 
of system features and a set of system principles for system development to meet these 
requirements. The user requirements include a need to translate expert knowledge into 
actionable knowledge for non-experts. One development principle is that knowledge 
translation requires radical iteration with functional prototypes. 
(IV) Theory for 
explaining and _ (V) Theory for 
predicting design and action 
(EP theory) 
(II) Theory for \ / (III) Theory for 
explaining \ / predicting 
(I) Theory for 
analyzing 
Figure 1. Interrelationships among Theory Types _I 
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Type IV theory was tested in several ways. Experiments by 
Otto Koppius to test the effects of information feedback in 
multi-attribute reverse auctions are reported (p. 82). Type V 
theory is evident in the guidelines that are given for the 
construction of electronic markets: "You must also create a 
social context for trading, one that is similar to traditional 
markets" (p. 3) and the strategies for introducing dynamic 
markets (Chapter 8). The integration of different sources of 
evidence and different types of theorizing in this monograph 
is impressive and the book has appeal to practitioners. 
Personal experience has shown that it was read and appre 
ciated by the manager of a farmers' cooperative that was in 
the early stages of developing an electronic market. More 
over, the underlying academic work satisfies rigorous aca 
demic standards. Koppius' (2002) thesis study was awarded 
the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) 
Best Dissertation Award in 2002. Together, these endeavors 
have led to a comprehensive, impressive body of theory. 
It has been argued in other disciplines that different 
approaches to theory should be recognized and combined. In 
the field of management, DiMaggio (1995) suggests that 
many of the best theories are hybrids, combining the best 
qualities of covering-law, enlightenment, and process ap 
proaches. DiMaggio sees each of these types of theory as 
valid, but limited. In a similar vein, Weick (1995) sees many 
products that are labeled as theory as valuable, but as 
approximations to theory, with "strong" or "full-blown" 
theory a result of many interim struggles in theorizing. 
Application of the Taxonomy ^^^^M 
The taxonomy was used to classify 50 research articles in two 
leading journals to demonstrate its applicability. Issues of 
MIS Quarterly and Information Systems Research from 
March 2003 to June 2004 were used as the source of the 
articles. All articles except issues and opinions, review 
articles, and research essays were included in the classifi 
cation process. Classification was performed by the author 
and a junior researcher independently, using the distin 
guishing attributes in Table 2 as the primary basis for deci 
sions to assign an article to one of Types I to V. Of the 50 
articles studied, 45 were classified identically by each 
researcher separately in the initial round. Five articles 
required discussion before a decision was made on classifi 
cation. The appendix shows the results of this classification. 
The purpose of this classification activity was not to deter 
mine the relative frequency of publication of different theory 
types, but to test on a small scale whether the classification 
schema is (1) exhaustive, (2) understandable, and (3) does not 
have unnecessary categories. The activity showed that the 
schema appears to be exhaustive: no papers were found that 
could not be classified under the schema. The decision rules 
to allocate theory to a category appear to be understandable, 
as the junior researcher was able to apply them independently 
and arrive at similar conclusions to the author. The question 
arises as to whether the Type III category is really necessary. 
Only one article was found with theory that fell into category 
III: prediction without causal explanation. It is believed that 
this category should be retained, even if instances in this class 
are few, both for analytic completeness and as it is a type of 
theory recognized by a number of authors. Table 9 shows the 
relative frequency of each theory type. 
Questions for Discussion ^^ B 
This essay has presented a number of ideas about theory in IS 
and proposed a taxonomy for classifying the theories we 
develop. Many of the ideas about theory presented are not 
new and have been taken from a considerable literature. 
Nevertheless, the selection and combination of these ideas 
leads to a taxonomy that differs considerably in emphasis 
from what is commonly found in discussion of IS research. 
An aim of the paper is to challenge and promote discussion of 
the nature of theory as a topic worthy of discussion in its own 
right. To this end, discussion follows under the headings of 
questions that encourage dialectic and some personal opinions 
and value judgements are included. 
Do some theory types belong to particular research 
paradigms? 
An unequivocal "no" is the answer to this question. In 
principle, one individual could theorize using any of the forms 
of theory. Theory Types II to V require some form of realist 
ontology, as constructs in theoretical statements can refer to 
entities in the real world. Type I theory does not necessitate 
reference to real-world entities, but could be purely analytic, 
as in mathematics and logic. Apart from this qualification, 
none of the theory types necessitate a specific ontological or 
epistemological position (for example, an interpretative 
stance, or naive realism, or value-free enquiry, or quantitative 
methods). While it is argued that no theory class is exclu 
sively the province of any paradigm, proponents of specific 
paradigms favor some forms of theory more than others. 
Proponents of the interpretivist paradigm have argued for the 
recognition of theory Type II: theory for explaining but not 
precise prediction. Logical positivism, characterized as an 
extreme form of empiricism, can be linked to some propo 
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Table 9 Classification of articles in MIS Quarterly and Information 
Systems Research (March 2003 
- June 2004) 
Theory Type Frequency of Occurrence 
I. Analysis 3 
II. Explanation 4 
III. Prediction 1 
IV. Explanation and prediction (EP) 33 
V. Design and action 9 
Total 50 
nents of theory Type III. It would be wrong to conclude, 
however, that all people who develop Type III theory are 
logical positivists or that all people who develop theory Type 
II are interpretivists, or that interpretivists build theory Type 
II only. What is commonly held to be natural-science type 
theory is Type III or Type IV theory, where there is theory 
that can be tested. It appears that people who describe them 
selves as positivist researchers in IS do so primarily when 
they engage in research that includes testable theory of these 
types. Again, this is not to say that only people who call 
themselves positivists build Types III and IV theory. 
To reiterate, paradigmatic labels should not be attached to any 
of the theory types. There is no clear and direct connection 
between any theory type and any one paradigm. 
Is one type of theory more valuable than another? 
Here again a very strong "no" is the answer to this question. 
The discussion of the classes of theory has avoided as far as 
possible any value-laden words like formal, traditional, 
complete, or "higher" or "lower" theory. Each class of theory 
can provide important and valuable contributions. 
Illustrating the importance of Type I theory, we see examples 
such as Linnaeus' 18th century system for classifying plants 
into groups depending on the number of stamens in their 
flowers, which provided a much-needed framework for 
identification (Wordsworth 1994). The many examples in IS 
include Kwon and Zmud's (1987) effort to unify the frag 
mented models of information systems implementation with 
a categorization of factors linked to the implementation 
process. Type II theories have led to important new insights 
into phenomena related to IS. Type V theory also has obvious 
value in IS. This type of knowledge is what we impart to our 
students and what fills our textbooks on applications and 
systems development (for example, see the text by Turban 
and Aronson (2001) on decision support and intelligent 
systems). 
Types III and IV theory match common conceptions of 
scientific-type theory, according to the natural sciences 
model, as they provide theory that yields testable propo 
sitions. As such, they have found ready acceptance in IS. 
The words scientific and science, however, are used in dif 
ferent ways in different quarters, so it is unwise to attach them 
definitively to any of the theory types or to use them to argue 
for the legitimacy or value of one type of theory at the 
expense of another. 
Should the word theory be used for all five classes of theory? 
Proponents have been identified for each theory type to show 
that each has some support as a form of theorizing. For each 
class, however, there are also opponents, who would not 
agree that this is an appropriate view of theory. Taking each 
class of theory in turn, 
Type I: Analytic theory. Proponents include Fawcett and 
Downs (1986) and McKelvey (1982). Others (Bacharach 
1989; Doty and Glick 1994; Dubin 1978; Kerlinger 1973; 
Nagel 1979; Popper 1980) would argue against this class 
of theory because no predictions are made that can be 
empirically tested. This class also does not entail rea 
soning on the basis of causality of any type, which would 
further disqualify it from being theory for some (Nagel 
1979). 
Type IT. Theory for explaining. A form of theory recog 
nized by DiMaggio (1995), Guba and Lincoln (1994), 
Klein and Myers (1999), and Schwandt (1994). Again, 
the omission of statements that can be empirically tested 
would disqualify this class of theory for some (Doty and 
Glick 1994; Dubin 1978; Kerlinger 1973; Nagel 1979; 
Popper 1980). 
Type HI. Theory for prediction. This class matches 
Dubin's (1978) specification of theory, eschewing state 
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ments of causality (explanations) in theory, believing that 
they belong to the field of rhetoric. Friedman's (1953) 
views add support. Others would disagree with this view 
of theory, either implicitly or explicitly endorsing a view 
that theory should include underlying justifications for 
causally based explanations, not just covering-law 
explanations on the basis of universal or statistical 
regularities (Kaplan 1964; Merton 1967; Nagel 1979). 
Type IV: Theory for explaining andpredicting. Authors 
who expect both explanation and prediction in a theory 
include Kaplan (1964), Kerlinger (1973), Merton (1967), 
and Nagel (1979). Some opposition to this type of theory 
can be detected in the work of Mohr (1982), who held 
that process-type and variance-type theory should not be 
mixed. The examination of a sample of IS articles, how 
ever, showed a majority were classified as Type IV 
theory. 
Type V: Theory for design and action. Simon (1996) is 
the well-recognized proponent of this form of theory and 
others have followed his lead (Gregor and Jones 2004; 
Iivari 1983; Markus et al. 2002; Walls et al. 1992). 
Otherwise there is some feeling against recognizing 
design principles as theory. March and Smith (1995) and 
Hevner at al. (2004) promote design science as a research 
activity, but reserve the word theory for natural-science 
type research (Type III and IV theory). 
The approach argued for here is one of comprehensiveness, 
where, following Weick (1995, p. 386), 
We would like writers to feel free to use theory 
whenever they are theorizing. Modesty is all very 
well, but leaning over too far backward removes a 
good word from currency. 
An advantage of labeling as theory varying forms of theory 
development is that it forces theorizers to think clearly about 
what type of knowledge they are aiming at, and the nature of 
the statements that can and should be made within that theory 
type. Another outcome of thinking of theory in this way is 
that individual contributions to theory can be considered as 
complementary and integrated development of theory facili 
tated. Each type of theory lacks something that another type 
has. Stronger and fuller theory can result if we regard our 
efforts in building one type of theory as part of a larger whole 
and remain aware of potential connections between the 
subparts. 
Could there be a better way of classifying theory in IS? 
The taxonomy offered relies on the goals of a theory as the 
primary attribute on which to distinguish among classes of 
theories. The goal-related characteristics of theory are men 
tioned in many definitions of theory to varying degrees and 
thus appear to be a natural place to start in constructing a 
taxonomy. The only other structural characteristic identified 
as a possible candidate for distinguishing among theories is 
the level of generality. This characteristic is seen as of 
secondary importance to the goal, but could be used if a two 
dimensional classification schema was attempted. Further 
subclassifications within the types could possibly be 
attempted. Structural attributes have been used as the primary 
classifier for the taxonomy, rather than socio-technical or 
epistemological distinctions. A classification schema that 
relies on attributes of different types at the same level can be 
problematic. If classification is attempted on nonstructural 
grounds, then it should be done separately. 
This essay did not have a great deal to build on in taxonomic 
terms and it does not claim to be the final word on theory 
classification. There may be a number of other ways of 
classifying theory, or theory categories that can sensibly be 
added to the current taxonomy. Further, only a limited 
number of examples could be given for each theory type and 
attempts to classify a larger number of examples might reveal 
further subcategories of interest. 
Should one type of theory precede the other? 
The discussion of the interrelationships among the theory 
types suggests that one type of theory could lead to theory 
development of another type. Certainly, the components of 
theory Type I are necessary before theory of other types can 
be expressed clearly. The different types of theory, however, 
could each have many origins. The development of theory or 
conjectures in the first place can occur as a result of obser 
vations of what occurs in the real world (Godfrey-Smith 2003; 
Nagel 1979) or from insights or imagination or problems or 
feelings (Popper 1980). Construction of an artifact and Type 
V theory can spring from inventiveness and imagination, 
ahead of good knowledge of supporting theory of other types. 
Are these five theory types unique to IS? 
This question is difficult. The exploration in this essay has 
been done from an IS viewpoint, based on the underlying 
philosophy of enquiry in areas that are seen as relevant to IS: 
the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the sciences of 
the artificial. Other fields have a similar base and possibly 
similar types of theory could be detected; for example, in 
economics, accounting, management, engineering, or archi 
tecture. In none of these fields, however, are there artifacts of 
the same type that are so squarely at the intersection of human 
and machine behavior. Thus, it is possible that none of these 
other fields needs to draw so strongly on each of the physical 
and the behavioral sciences and the sciences of the artificial, 
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nor that they are so much in need of an integrative view of 
theory. In addition, it is possible that further exploration of 
theory for design and action will show that it takes on a 
unique form for IS artifacts (Gregor and Jones 2004). 
Writers in other disciplines have not considered the range in 
theory types that has been recognized here. DiMaggio 
(1995), Weick (1995), and others in the social sciences do not 
discuss theory for design and action. Simon (1996) con 
sidered design science and natural science models but not 
others. Nagel (1979) discusses natural and social science 
theory but not design science. To sum up, it appears the mix 
of theory types in which IS has a strong interest gives us a 
distinctive character. The strong theory that we can aim at, 
which includes all five theory types, will be a unique product 
of IS. 
Concluding Remarks __ _ __ 
This essay began with an examination of basic problem areas 
in conceptualizing theory: causality, explanation, prediction, 
and generality. Using the goals of theory as a primary means 
of classification, five interrelated types of theory were distin 
guished for IS: (1) theory for analyzing, (2) theory for ex 
plaining, (3) theory for predicting, (4) theory for explaining 
and predicting (EP), and (5) theory for design and action. The 
basic building blocks of theory have been shown to include 
the necessary components of means of representation, con 
structs, relationships between constructs and the specification 
of the scope of the theory. In addition, components that vary 
depending on the nature of the theory include causally based 
explanations (as opposed to covering-law explanations), 
verifiable statements (testable propositions), and prescriptive 
statements. Examples of each theory type have been pre 
sented and it has been shown that there are both proponents 
and opponents for the attachment of the label theory to each 
class. 
There are some potential limitations to the essay. The disci 
plinary areas included for examination were the natural 
sciences, the social sciences and the sciences of the artificial. 
There are other disciplines with different traditions that are 
also relevant but were excluded from this initial exploration. 
These disciplines include art, design, architecture, computer 
science, law, and mathematics. Mathematics, logic, and com 
puter science have long been contributors to the foundations 
of Information Systems. Art and design could be relevant if 
we think of the design process for IS as being a creative 
activity. A further limitation to any essay of this type is the 
difficulty in presenting very complex philosophical issues in 
a limited space. Readers are referred for more in-depth treat 
ments to recent examinations of the philosophy of science (for 
example, Godfrey-Smith 2003) and the excellent anthology of 
original writings on philosophy and technology compiled by 
Scharff and Dusak (2003). 
The essay makes contribution at several levels. Novice 
researchers should benefit from the depiction of the basic 
components of theory, helping with their question of "What 
is theory?" The approach recommended for theory develop 
ment is to begin with the research problem and research ques 
tions and then determine which type of theory is appropriate 
for the problem, given the current state of knowledge in the 
area and using the classes depicted here as a guide. An 
epistemological approach and research methods are then 
chosen as a further step. Whether one regards oneself as a 
positivist or an interpretivist or a scientist should not be the 
primary question and indeed this categorization may not make 
much sense, given the simplistic and inconsistent manner in 
which these terms are often used. It is suggested that 
researchers should think very carefully and separately about 
issues such as causality, explanation, generalization, and 
prediction in framing theory. With the realization that 
stronger theory can result from combining theory of different 
types, researchers should keep in mind the potential of their 
own theory to combine with other types. 
A further contribution of the essay is the support for the 
legitimization of each of the five classes of theory. We can 
see that views on what constitute theory vary considerably 
and it is possible that our journal editors, reviewers, and 
authors are not aware of this divergence in views, or that their 
own view of theory may differ considerably from that of 
others. Recognition that there are diverging views on the 
nature of process-type and variance-type theories and also that 
Type IV theory can combine both process and variance 
aspects is particularly important. Hopefully the arguments in 
this essay can be used as justification by researchers for the 
value of their own theory types. 
Finally this essay, in addressing the structural nature of IS 
theory, addresses an aspect of IS research that has been given 
scant attention in comparison with discussion of our disci 
plinary domain, epistemological approaches, and socio 
political issues. If it can provoke further attention to this 
aspect of our research endeavors, then it will fulfil a useful 
purpose. The lingering remnants of logical positivist thought 
that accord with the omission of causal reasoning from 
theoretical statements should be explicitly confronted and we 
should be very careful with our language in proposing theory, 
for example, in differentiating between generality and predic 
tive power, in defining the scope of a theory, and in the 
wording of propositions. 
634 MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
As this essay had relatively little prior work on which to 
build, there are many opportunities for further work. Each of 
the theory types could be analyzed in more detail, both for 
structural characteristics and for instances of work performed. 
The components of the theory types have been described in 
fairly general terms. More precision could be attempted by 
specifying the components in terms of symbolic logic or by 
structuring each type according to Toulmin's model of 
argumentation (Toulmin et al. 1979), which contains very 
similar constructs and gives a useful model of everyday 
reasoning. Cross-classification of each theory type in terms 
of level of generality could be attempted. Empirical investi 
gation of trends in producing theory of different types could 
be undertaken. Each of the issues of causality, explanation, 
and prediction could be analyzed in greater depth with the aim 
of making argument about these issues more accessible to IS 
researchers, as Lee and Baskerville (2003) have done with the 
issue of generalizability. 
To conclude, this essay was motivated by the perception that 
a fresh approach to the foundations and identity of our 
discipline is needed, focusing on the nature of our theory as 
a fundamental issue. Information Systems is a new discipline 
and many of us come from very different backgrounds?from 
physics, chemistry, mathematics, psychology, management, 
sociology, philosophy, and computer science. We need a 
language of our own to talk about theory and should not adopt 
uncritically ideas about what constitutes theory from any one 
other disciplinary area. The nature of theory in itself is at 
least as important as domain, epistemological and socio 
political questions, which to date have attracted a dispropor 
tionate share of the discussion of IS research. A common 
language to discuss the nature of our theories should facilitate 
the building of sound, cumulative, integrated, and practical 
bodies of theory in IS. 
Acknowledgments 
Thank you to Allen S. Lee and the reviewers who have helped 
a great deal in improving this paper. Thanks are also due to 
the many friends and colleagues who have commented on 
earlier versions of the paper. Particular thanks are due to M. 
Lynne Markus, who has been generous in her support, and to 
Robert Johnston, for his motivating arguments. 
References 
Achinstein, P. The Nature of Explanations, Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1983. 
Agre, P. "Computational Research on Interaction and Agency," 
Artificial Intelligence (72:1), 1995, pp. 1-52. 
Ashby, W. R. An Introduction to Cybernetics, Chapman & Hall, 
London, 1956. 
Audi, R. (ed.). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed..), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999. 
Avison, D., Gregor, S., and Wilson, D. "Managerial IT Uncon 
sciousness," Communications of the ACM (49:7), July 2006, pp. 
88-93. 
Avison, D., and Wood-Harper, T. Multiview: An Exploration in 
Information Systems Development, McGraw-Hill, Maidenhead, 
UK, 1990. 
Bacharach, S. B. "Organizational Theories: Some Criteria for 
Evaluation," Academy of Management Review (14:4), 1989, pp. 
496-515. 
Baskerville, R, and Wood-Harper, A. T. "Diversity in Information 
Systems Action Research Methods," European Journal of 
Information Systems (7:2), 1998, pp. 90-107. 
Benbasat, I. "Editorial Notes," Information Systems Research 
(12:2), 2001, pp. iii-iv. 
Benbasat, I., and Weber, R. "Research Commentary: Rethinking 
'Diversity' in Information Systems Research," Information 
Systems Research (7:4), 1996, pp. 389-399. 
Benbasat, I., and Zmud, R. "The Identity Crisis Within the IS 
Discipline: Defining and Communicating the Discipline's Core 
Properties," MIS Quarterly (27:2), 2003, pp. 183-194. 
Bhattacherjee, A., and Premkumar, G. "Understanding Changes in 
Belief and Attitude Towards Information Technology Usage: A 
Theoretical Model and Longitudinal Test," MIS Quarterly (28:2), 
2004, pp. 229-254. 
Burstein, F., and Gregor, S. "The Systems Development or Engi 
neering Approach to Research in Information Systems: An 
Action Research Perspective," in Proceedings of the 10th 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems, B. Hope and 
P. Yoong (eds.), Victoria University of Wellington, New 
Zealand, 1999, pp. 122-134. 
Codd, E. F. "A Relational Model of Data for Large Shared Data 
Banks," Communications of the ACM (13:6), 1970, pp. 377-387. 
Cook, T. D., and Campbell, D. T. Quasi-Experimentation Design 
and Analysis Issuesfor Field Settings, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 
MA, 1979. 
Craik, K. The Nature of Explanation, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 1943. 
Cross, N. "Design/Science/Research: Developing a Discipline," 
paper presented at the Fifth Asian Design Conference: 
International Symposium on Design Science, Su Jeong Dang 
Printing Company, Seoul, Korea 2001. 
Cushing, B. E. "Frameworks, Paradigms and Scientific Research in 
Management Information Systems," Journal of Information 
Systems (4:2), 1990, pp. 38-59. 
Davis, F. D. "Perceived Usefulness, Perceived Ease-of-Use, and 
User Acceptance of Information Technology," MIS Quarterly 
(13:3), 1989, pp. 319-340. 
Davis, F. D. A Technology Acceptance Model for Empirically 
Testing New End-user Information Systems: Theory and Results, 
unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Sloan School of Management, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1986. 
MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 635 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Davis, F. D., Bagozzi, R., and Warshaw, P. "User Acceptance of 
Computer Technology: A Comparison of Two Theoretical 
Models," Management Science (35:8), 1989, pp. 982-1003. 
Davis, G. B. "Information Systems Conceptual Foundations: 
Looking Backward and Forward," in Organizational and Social 
Perspectives on Information Technology, R. Baskerville, J. Stage, 
and J. I. DeGross (eds.), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston 
2000, pp. 61-82. 
Davis, G. B., and Olson, M. H. Management Information Systems: 
Conceptual Foundations, Structure and Development (2nd ed.), 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1985. 
DeLone, W. H., and McLean, E. R. "The DeLone and Mclean 
Model of Information System Success: A Ten-Year Update," 
JournalofManagement Information Systems (19:4), Spring 2003, 
pp. 9-30. 
DeLone, W. H., and McLean, E. R. "Information Systems Success: 
The Quest for the Dependent Variable," Information Systems 
Research (3:1), 1992, pp. 60-95. 
Denzin, N. K., and Lincoln, Y. S (eds.). Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1994. 
DiMaggio, P. J. "Comments on 'What Theory is Not'," 
Administrative Sciences Quarterly (40:3), 1995, pp. 391-397. 
Doty, D. H., and Glick, W. H. "Typologies as a Unique Form of 
Theory Building: Towards Improved Understanding and 
Modeling," Academy of Management Review 19(2), 1994, pp. 
230-251. 
Dubin, R. Theory Building (Rev. ed.), Free Press, London, 1978. 
Duhem, P. The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, Atheneum, 
New York, 1962. 
Fawcett, J., and Downs, F. S. The Relationship of Theory and 
Research, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Norwalk, CT, 1986. 
Foucault, M. Les Mots et les Choses. Une Archeologie des Sciences 
Humaines, Gallimard, Paris, translated by A. Sheridan as the The 
Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, 
Tavistock Publications, London, 1971. 
Freese, L. "Formal Theorizing," Annual Review of Sociology (6), 
1980, pp. 187-212. 
Friedman, M. Essays in Positive Economics, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1953. 
Friedman, M. "Explanation and Scientific Understanding," Journal 
of Philosophy (71:1), 1974, pp. 5-19. 
Gane, C, and Sarson, T. Structured Systems Analysis: Tools and 
Techniques, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1979. 
Giddens, A. The Constitution of Society, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 1984. 
Glaser, B. G., and Strauss, A. L. The Discovery of Grounded 
Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research, Aldine Publishing 
Company, Chicago, 1967. 
Godfrey-Smith, P. Theory and Reality, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 2003. 
Goode, S. "Organizational Size Metrics in IS Research: A Critical 
Survey of the Literature 1989-2000," in Proceedings of the 12th 
Australasian Conference on Information Systems, G. Finnie, D. 
Cecez-Kecmanovic, and B. Lo (eds.), Coffs Harbour, Australia, 
December 4-7, 2001, pp. 257-268. 
Goode, S. "On the Theoretical Justification of the Organizational 
Size Construct in Information Systems Research," in Proceedings 
of 6th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, The Japan 
Society for Management Information, Tokyo, Japan, 2002. 
Gorry, G. A., and Scott Morton, M. S. "A Framework for Manage 
ment Information Systems," Sloan Management Review (13:1), 
1971, pp. 55-70. 
Gregor, S. "Design Theory in Information Systems," Australian 
Journal of Information Systems, Special Issue 2002a, pp. 14-22. 
Gregor, S. "A Theory of Theories in Information Systems," in 
Information Systems Foundations: Building the Theoretical 
Base, S. Gregor and D. Hart (eds.), Australian National 
University, Canberra, 2002b, pp. 1-20. 
Gregor, S., and Benbasat, I. "Explanations from Intelligent 
Systems: Theoretical Foundations and Implications for Practice," 
MIS Quarterly (23:4), 1999, pp. 497-530. 
Gregor S., and Jones, D. "The Formulation of Design Theories," in 
Constructing the Infrastructure for the Knowledge Economy: 
Methods and Tools, Theory and Practice, H. Linger, J. Fisher, W. 
Wojtkowski, J. Zupancic, K. Vigo, and J. Arold (eds.), Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston, 2004, pp. 83-93. 
Gribbin, J. Science: A History 1543?2001, Allen Lane, 
Camberwell, Victoria, Australia, 2002. 
Guba, E. G, and Lincoln, Y. "Competing Paradigms in Qualitative 
Research," in Handbook of Qualitative Research, N. K. Denzin, 
and. Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
1994, pp. 105-117. 
Habermas, J. Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 1: Reason 
and the Rationalization of Society, Heinemann, London, UK, 
1984. 
Hempel, C. G., and Oppenheim, P. "Studies in the Logic of 
Explanation," Philosophy of Science (15), 1948, pp. 135-175. 
Hevner, A., March, S., Park, J., and Ram, S. "Design Science in 
Information Systems Research," MS Quarterly (28:1), 2004, pp. 
75-105. 
Hitt, L., and Bryjolfsson, E. "Productivity, Business Profitability 
and Consumer Surplus: Three Different Measures of Technology 
Value," MIS Quarterly (20:2), 1996, pp. 121-142. 
Hooker, R. Aristotle: The Four Causes, 1996 (available online at 
http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GREECE/4CAUSES.HTM). 
Hospers, J. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (2nd ed.), 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967. 
Huber, G., and Van de Ven, A. (eds.). Longitudinal Field Research 
Methods, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 1995. 
Hume, D. "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding," 1748. 
Reprinted in Introduction to Philosophy Classical and Contem 
porary Readings (3rd ed.), J. Perry and M. Bratman (eds.), Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 190-220. 
Iivari, J. Contributions to the Theoretical Foundations of Sys 
temeering Research and the Picoco Model, Institute of Data 
processing Science, University of Oulu, Oulu, Finland, 1983. 
Iivari, J. "A Paradigmatic Analysis of Contemporary Schools of IS 
Development," European Journal of Information Systems (1:4), 
1991, pp. 249-272. 
Iivari, J., Hirschheim, R., and Klein, H. K. "A Dynamic Frame 
work for Classifying Information Systems Development 
636 MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Methodologies and Approaches," Journal of Management 
Information Systems (17:3), 2000 -2001, pp. 179-218. 
Iivari, J., Hirschheim, R., and Klein, H. K. "A Paradigmatic Analy 
sis Contrasting Information Systems Development Approaches 
and Methodologies," Information Systems Research (9:2), 1998, 
pp. 1-30. 
Kambil, A., and Van Heck, E. Making Markets: How Firms Can 
Design and Profit from Online Auctions and Exchanges, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2002. 
Kant, I. "Critique of Pure Reason," 1781, in Continental Philosophy 
An Anthology, W. McNeill and K. S. Feldman (eds.), Blackwell, 
Maiden, MA, 1998, pp. 7-23. 
Kaplan, A. The Conduct of Enquiry, Harper Row, New York, 1964. 
Kerlinger, F. N. Foundations of Behavioural Research (2nd ed.), 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1973. 
Kim, J. "Causation," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(2nd ed.), R. Audi (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 1999, pp. 125-127. 
Klein, H., and Myers, M. "A Set of Principles for Conducting and 
Evaluating Interpretive Field Studies," MIS Quarterly (23:1), 
1999, pp. 67-93. 
Koppius, O. R. Information Architecture and Electronic Market 
Performance, ERIM Ph.D. Series Research in Management 13, 
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, 2002. 
Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolution, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996. 
Kwon, T. H., and Zmud, R. W. "Unifying the Fragmented Models 
of Information Systems Implementation," in Critical Issues in 
Information Systems Research, R. J. Boland and R. A. 
Hirschheim (eds.), John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 1987, 
pp. 227-251. 
Latour, B. "Technology is Society Made Durable," in_4 Sociology 
of Monsters: Essays on Power, Technology and Domination, J. 
Law (ed.), Routledge, London, 1991, pp. 103-131. 
Lau, F. "A Review on the Use of Action Research in Information 
Systems Studies," in Information Systems and Qualitative 
Research, A. S. Lee, L. A. Liebenau and J. I. DeGross (eds.), 
Chapman & Hall, London, 1997, pp. 31-68. 
Lee, A. "Integrating Positivist and Interpretive Approaches to 
Organizational Research," Organization Science (2:4), 1991, pp. 
342-365. 
Lee, A. S. "Editorial," MIS Quarterly (25:1), 2001, pp. iii-vii. 
Lee, A. S., and Baskerville, R. L. "Generalizing Generalizability 
in Information Systems Research," Information Systems Research 
(14:3), 2003, pp. 221-243. 
Lee, B., Barua, A., and Whinston, A. B. "Discovery and Repre 
sentation of Causal Relationships in MIS: A Methodological 
Framework," MS Quarterly (21:1), 1997, pp. 109-134. 
Lewin, K. "The Research Centre for Group Dynamics at Massa 
chusetts Institute of Technology," Sociometry (8), 1945, pp. 126 
135. 
Little, D. E. "Philosophy of the Social Sciences," in The Cambridge 
Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd ed.), R. Audi (ed.), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1999, pp. 704-706. 
Locke, J. "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," 1689. 
Reprinted in Introduction to Philosophy Classical and Con 
temporary Readings (3rd ed.), J. Perry and M. Bratman (eds.), 
Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, pp. 139-144. 
Magee, B. Confessions of a Philosopher, Phoenix, London, 1998. 
March, S. T., and Smith, G. F. "Design and Natural Science 
Research on Information Technology," Decision Support Systems 
(15), 1995, pp. 251-266. 
Markus, M., Majchrzak, L. A., and Gasser, L. "A Design Theory 
for Systems that Support Emergent Knowledge Processes," MIS 
Quarterly (26:3), 2002, pp. 179-212. 
Markus, M. L., and Robey, D. "Information Technology and 
Organizational Change: Causal Structure in Theory and 
Research," Management Science 34(5), 1988, 583-598. 
Mayes, G R. "Theories of Explanation," Internet Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy, August 11 2004 (available online at http://www. 
utm.edu/research/iep/e/explanat.htm). 
McKelvey, B. Organizational Systematics 
- 
Taxonomy, Evolution, 
Classification, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 
1982. 
Merton, R. K. Social Theory Social Structure, Free Press, New 
York, 1968. 
Merton, R. K Theoretical Sociology, Free Press, New York, 1967. 
Miles, M., and Huberman, A. An Expanded Sourcebook Qualitative 
Data Analysis (2nd ed.), Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA, 
1994. 
Miles, R. E., and Snow, C. C. Organization, Strategy, Structure and 
Process, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1978. 
Mingers, J. "Combining IS Research Methods: Towards a Pluralist 
Methodology," Information Systems Research (12:3), 2001, pp. 
240-259. 
MISQ. MISQ Roadmap. Information for Prospective Authors,. 
August 2004 (http://wAVW.misq.org/roadmap/standards.html). 
Mohr, L. B. Explaining Organizational Behavior the Limits and 
Possibilities of Theory and Research, Jossey-Bass, San 
Francisco, CA, 1982. 
Moore, G. E. "Cramming More Components onto Integrated 
Circuits," Electronics (38:8), 1965, pp. 114-117. 
Morrison, J., and George, J. F. "Exploring the Software Engi 
neering Component in MIS Research," Communications of the 
ACM(38:7), 1995, pp. 80-91. 
Nagel, E. The Structure of Science, Hackett Publishing Co., 
Indianapolis, IN, 1979. 
Neuman, W. L. Social Research Methods (4th ed.), Allyn and 
Bacon, Boston, 2000. 
Ngwenyama, O., and Lee, A. "Communication Richness in 
Electronic Mail: Critical Social Theory and the Contextuality of 
Meaning," MIS Quarterly (21:2), 1997, pp. 145-167. 
Norton, D. F. "Hume," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 
(2nd ed.), R. Audi (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK, 1999, pp. 398-403. 
Nunamaker, J., Chen, M., and Purdin, T. "Systems Development in 
Information Systems Research," Journal of Management 
Information Systems (7:3), 1990-91, pp. 89-106. 
OED (Oxford English Dictionary) Online, August 10 2004 
(http://dictionary.oed.com). 
MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 637 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Orlikowski, W. J. "The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the 
Concept of Technology in Organizations," Organization Science 
(3:3), 1992, pp. 398-427. 
Orlikowski, W. J., and Baroudi, J. J. "Studying Information Tech 
nology in Organizations: Research Approaches and Assump 
tions," Information Systems Research (2:1), 1991, pp. 1-28. 
Orlikowski, W. J., and Iacono, C. S. "Research Commentary: 
Desperately Seeking the 'IT' in IT Research?A Call to 
Theorizing the IT Artifact," Information Systems Research 
(12:2), 2001, pp. 121-134. 
Orlowski, W. J., and Robey, D. "Information Technology and the 
Structuring of Organizations," Information Systems Research 
(2:2), 1991, pp. 143-169. 
Passmore, J. "Logical Positivism," in Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(Volume V), P. Edwards (ed.), Macmillan, New York, 1967, pp. 
52-57. 
Pearl, J . Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2000. 
Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations (3rd ed.), Routledge 
Classics, London, 2002. 
Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Unwin Hyman, 
London, 1980. 
Popper, K. Logik der Forschung, Julius Springer, Vienna, 1934. 
Popper, K. Unended Quest an Intellectual A utobiography, Fontana, 
Glasgow, 1986. 
Robey, D. "Research Commentary: Diversity in Information 
Systems Research: Threat, Promise, and Responsibility," Infor 
mation Systems Research (7:4), 1996, pp. 400-408. 
Rogers, E. M. Diffusion of Innovations. (4th ed.), The Free Press, 
New York, 1995. 
Scharff, R., and Dusak, V. (eds.). Philosophy of Technology: The 
Technological Condition An Anthology, Blackwell, Maiden, MA, 
2003. 
Schwandt, I. A. "Constructivist, Interpretivist Approaches to 
Human Inquiry," in Handbook of Qualitative Enquiry, N. K. 
Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), Sage Publications, Thousand 
Oaks,CA, 1994, pp. 118-137. 
Seddon, P. "A Respecification and Extension of the DeLone and 
McLean Model of IS Success," Information Systems Research 
(8:3), 1997, pp. 240-251. 
Shannon, C. "A Mathematical Theory of Communication," The Bell 
System Technical Journal (27), July/October 1948, pp. 
379-423/623-656. 
Simon, H. The Sciences of the Artificial (3rd ed.), MIT Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1996. 
Simpson, G. G. Principles of Animal Taxonomy, Columbia Univer 
sity Press, New York, 1961. 
Sommerville, I. Software Engineering (6th ed.), Addison-Wesley, 
Harlow, England, 2001. 
Sutton, R. I., and Staw, B. M. "What Theory is Not," Adminis 
trative Sciences Quarterly (40:3), 1995, pp. 371-384. 
Toulmin, S. The Uses of Argument, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, UK, 1958. 
Toulmin, S., Rieke, R., and Janik, A. An Introduction to Reasoning, 
Macmillan, New York, 1979. 
Turban, E., and Aronson, J. Decision Support Systems and Intelli 
gent Systems, Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2001. 
Von Bertalanffy, L. General System Theory (Rev. ed.), George 
Braziller, New York, 1973. 
Walls, J. G, Widmeyer, G R, and El Sawy, O. A. "Building an 
Information System Design Theory for Vigilant EIS," 
Information Systems Research (3:1), 1992, pp. 36-59. 
Walsham, G. "Interpretative Case Studies in IS Research: Nature 
and Method," European Journal of Information Systems (4:2), 
1995, pp. 74-81. 
Watson, R. "Research in Information Systems: What We Haven't 
Learned," MIS Quarterly (25:4), 2001, pp. v-xv. 
Weber, R. "Toward a Theory of Artifacts: A Paradigmatic Base for 
Information Systems Research," Journal of Information Systems 
(1:2), Spring 1987, pp. 3-19. 
Weber, R. "Editor's Comments," MS Quarterly, (27:2), 2003, pp. 
iii-xi. 
Weber, R. "Editor's Comments," MS Quarterly, (28:1), 2004, pp. 
iii-xii. 
Weber, R. Ontological Foundations of Information Systems, 
Coopers & Lybrand, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 1997. 
Weick, K. E. "Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination," 
Academy of Management Review (14:4), 1989, pp. 516-531. 
Weick, K. E. "What Theory Is Not, Theorizing Is," Administrative 
Sciences Quarterly (40:3), 1995, pp. 385-390. 
Wordsworth. Wordsworth Dictionary of Biography. Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd, Hertfordshire, UK 1994. 
Yin, R. K. Case Study Research Design and Methods (2nd ed.), Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA 1994. 
About the Author 
Shirley Gregor is the ANU Endowed Chair in Information Systems 
at the Australian National University, Canberra, where she heads the 
National Centre for Information Systems Research and is Head of 
the School of Accounting and Business Information Systems. 
Professor Gregor's current research interests include the adoption 
and strategic use of information and communications technologies, 
intelligent systems and human-computer interface issues, and the 
theoretical foundations of information systems. Professor Gregor 
spent a number of years in the computing industry in Australia and 
the United Kingdom before beginning an academic career. She has 
published in journals including MS Quarterly, International 
Journal of Electronic Commerce, International Journal of Human 
Computer Studies, European Journal of Information Systems, and 
Information Technology & People. Professor Gregor was inaugural 
President of the Australasian Association of Information Systems 
2002-2003 and was made an Officer of the Order of Australia in the 
Queen's Birthday Honours list in June 2005 for services as an 
educator and researcher in the field of Information Systems and for 
the development of applications for electronic commerce in the 
agribusiness sector. 
638 MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Appendix 
Classification of Recent Research Articles ^^HHHH^^HI|^^HBHaHIBHg_____l 
Only research articles and research notes are included. Issues and opinions, reviews, and research essays are excluded. 
Journal 
Issue Title of Research Article Author(s) Theory Type 
MIS Quarterly 
March 2003 Predicting Intention to Adopt Interorganizational H. H. Teo, K. K. Wei, and I. Benbasat IV 
- EP 
Linkages: An Institutional Perspective 
Trust and TAM in Online Shopping: An Integrated D. Gefen, E. Karahanna, and D. W. IV 
- EP 
Model Straub 
Understanding the Service Component of Application A. Susarla, A. Barua, and A. B. IV 
- EP 
Service Provision: An Empirical Analysis of Whinston 
Satisfaction with Asp Services 
Issues in Linking Information Technology Capability to R. Santhanam and E. Hartono IV 
- EP 
Firm Performance 
CIO Lateral Influence Behaviors: Gaining Peers' H. G. Enns, S. L. Huff and C. Higgins IV- EP 
Commitment to Strategic Information Systems 
June 2003 Reconceptualizing Users as Social Actors in Infor- R. Lamb and R. Kling II 
- 
mation Systems Research Explanation1 
Shaping Agility Through Digital Options: Reconcep- V. Sambamurthy, A. Bharadwaj, and V. IV 
- EP 
tualizing the Role of Information Technology in Con- Grover 
temporary Firms 
Virtualness and Knowledge in Teams: Managing the T. L. Griffith, J. E. Sawyer, and M. A. IV 
- EP 
Love Triangle of Organizations, Individuals, and Neale 
Information Technology 
The Adoption and Use of GSS in Project Teams: A. R. Dennis and M. J. Garfield IV - EP 
Toward More Participative Processes and Outcomes 
September From the Vendor's Perspective: Exploring the Value N. Levina and J. W. Ross II - 
2003 Proposition in Information Technology Outsourcing Explanation 
Trust and the Unintended Effects of Behavior Control G. Piccoli and B. Ives IV - EP 
in Virtual Teams 
The Influence of Query Interface Design on Decision- C. Speier and M. G. Morris IV - EP 
Making Performance 
User Acceptance of Information Technology: Toward V. Venkatesh, M. G. Morris, G. B. IV - EP 
_a Unified View_Davis, 
and F. P. 
Davis_ 
MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 639 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Journal 
Issue Title of Research Article Author(s) Theory Type 
MIS Quarterly 
December The Contingent Effects of Management Support and R. Sharma and P. Yetton IV - EP 
2003 Task Interdependence on Successful Information 
Systems Implementation 
The Disruptive Nature of Information Technology K. Lyytinen and G. M. Rose IV - EP2 
Innovations: The Case of Internet Computing in 
Systems Development Organizations 
The Value Relevance of Announcements of B. Defining, V. J. Richardson, and R. IV - EP 
Transformational Information Technology Investments W. Zmud 
Sources of Influence on Beliefs about Information W. Lewis, R. Agarwal, and V. IV 
- EP 
Technology Use: An Empirical Study of Knowledge Sambamurthy 
Workers 
March 2004 User Heterogeneity and its Impact on Electronic R. Bapna, p. Goes, A. Gupta, and Y. I 
- 
Analysis3 
Auction Market Design: An Empirical Exploration Jin 
How Do Suppliers Benefit from Information M. Subramani IV - EP 
Technology Use in Supply Chain Relationships? 
June 2004 GIST: A Model for Design and Management of Con- T. C. Albert, P. B. Goes, and A. Gupta V 
- 
Design 
tent and Interactivity of Customer-centric Web Sites 
A Field Study of the Effect of Interpersonal Trust on D. L. Paul and R. R. McDaniel Jr. IV - EP 
Virtual Collaborative Relationship Performance 
Understanding Changes in Belief and Attitude Toward A. Bhattacherjee and G. Premkumar IV 
- EP 
Information Technology Usage: A Theoretical Model 
and Longitudinal Test 
The Effect of Relationship Encoding, Task Type, and N. Kumar and I. Benbasat IV - EP 
Complexity on Information Representation: An 
Empirical Evaluation of 2D and 3D Line Graphs 
Information Systems Research 
March 2003 Decentralized Mechanism Design for Supply Chain M. Fan, J. Stallaert, and A. B. V 
- 
Design 
Organizations Using an Auction Market Whinston 
XML-Based Schema Definition for Support of W. M. P. van der Aalst and A. Kumar V 
- 
Design 
Interorganizational Workflow 
Informational Influence in Organizations: An S. W. Sussman and W. S. Siegal IV 
- EP 
Integrated Approach to Knowledge Adoption 
When Subordinates Become it Contractors: Persis- V. T. Ho, S. Ang, and D. Straub IV 
- EP 
tent Managerial Expectations in IT Outsourcing 
The Social Construction of Meaning: An Alternative S. M. Miranda and C. S. Saunders IV 
- EP 
Perspective on Information Sharing _ 
Information Goods Pricing and Copyright Enforce- Y. Chen and I. Png V 
- 
Design 
_ment: Welfare Analysis_|_ 
640 MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Journal 
Issue Title of Research Article Author(s) Theory Type 
Information Systems Research 
June 2003 Measuring Information Technology Payoff: A Meta- R. Kohli and S. Devaraj IV 
- EP 
analysis of Structural Variables in Firm-level Empirical 
Research 
Developing and Validating an Observational Learning M. Y. Yi and F. D. Davis IV 
- EP 
Model of Computer Software Training and Skill 
Acquisition_ 
The Impact of Experience and Time on the Use of C. W. Fisher, I. Chengalur-Smith, and IV 
- EP 
Data Quality Information in Decision Making D. P. Ballou 
A Partial Least Squares Latent Variable Modeling W. Chin, B. Marcolin, p. Newsted V - Design4 
Approach for Measuring Interaction Effects: Results 
from a Monte Carlo Simulation Study and an 
Electronic-Mail Emotion/Adoption Study 
September Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems A. S. Lee and R. L. Baskerville I 
- 
Analysis 
2003 Research _ 
Replicating Online Yankee Auctions to Analyze R. Bapna, P. Goes, and A. Gupta III 
- 
Auctioneers' and Bidders' Strategies Prediction5 
Improving Analysis Pattern Reuse in Conceptual S. Purao, V. C. Storey, and T. Han V 
- 
Design 
Design: Augmenting Automated Processes with 
Supervised Learning 
Portfolios of Control in Outsourced Software V. Choudhury and R. Sabherwal II - 
Development Products Explanation 
December The Influence of Business Managers' IT Competence G. Bassellier, I. Benbasat, and B. IV - EP 
2003 on Championing IT Horner Reich 
Synthesis and Decomposition of Processes in A. Basu and R. W. Blanning V 
- 
Design 
Organizations 
A Research Note Regarding the Development of the C. D. Allport and W. A. Kerler III I - Analysis 
Consensus on Appropriation Scale 
March 2004 A Fault Threshold Policy to Manage Software I. Robert Chiang and V. S. Mookerjee V 
- 
Design 
Development Projects 
Economics of an Information Intermediary with H. K. Bhargava and V. Choudhary V - Design 
Aggregation Benefits 
Building Effective Online Marketplaces with P. A. Pavlou and D. Gefen IV - EP 
Institution-Based Trust 
Does Animation Attract Online Users' Attention? The W. Hong, J. Y. L. Thong, and K. Y. IV 
- EP 
Effects of Flash on Information Search Performance Tarn 
and Perceptions 
A Practice Perspective on Technology-Mediated U. Schultze and W. J. Orlikowski II - 
Network Relations: The Use of Internet-based Self- Explanation 
_serve Technologies_ 
MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 641 
Gregor/The Nature of Theory in IS 
Journal 
Issue Title of Research Article Author(s) Theory Type 
Information Systems Research 
June 2004 IT Outsourcing Strategies: Universalistic, Contin- J. Lee, S. M. Miranda and Y. Kim IV 
- EP 
gency and Configurational Explanations of Success 
Real Options and it Platform Adoption: Implications R. G. Fichman IV - EP 
for Theory and Practice 
An Empirical Analysis of Network Externalities in A. Asvanund, K. Clay, R. Krishnan and IV 
- EP 
Peer-to-Peer Music-Sharing Networks M. D. Smith 
Impact of Environmental Uncertainty and Task J. Karimi, T. M. Somers and Y. P. IV - EP 
Characteristics on User Satisfaction with Data Gupta 
Information Overload and the Message Dynamics of Q. Jones, G. Ravid and S. Rafaeli IV 
- EP 
Online Interaction Spaces: A Theoretical Model and 
Empirical Exploration 
Notes: 
EP = Explanation and Prediction 
Classified after discussion. Type I was also considered. 
Classified after discussion. 
Classified after discussion. 
Classified after discussion. A decision was made for Type V as the paper proposes an improved statistical method. 
Classified after discussion. A decision was made for Type III as the paper focuses on a simulation of auction behavior for modeling 
purposes (prediction). 
642 MIS Quarterly Vol. 30 No. 3/September 2006 
